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Copyright 1928 by Yale University Press. 
Printed w the United States of America. 


It needed but a few chapters to give the impression 
that this book was a complete survey of the illusions 
and disillusions, the fevered strivings and the sterile 
struggles, which went to form the travail of Euro- 
pean international life after the Great War. 

I have purposely refrained from writing these 
chapters, chiefly because I did not wish to touch, 
here, upon questions and episodes which might have 
led to the discussion of ideas or pretended ideas 
upon which, in other fields, I have openly expressed 
my thought. Moreover, apart from any such personal 
feeling, it seemed to me premature, and therefore 
useless, to attempt to paint a general picture of the 
whole ; the postwar history of Europe is still in the 
making. I have wished merely to add an historical 
contribution to that ensemble, by recording the as- 
pect and the trend of some events to which I could 
partly bear personal witness. 

Such as they are, these pages do not seek to con- 
ceal, although they may not proclaim, the political 
and moral ideals which were, and remain, my own. 

Undoubtedly, those who bear political responsi- 
bility for a great country are not entitled to call 
themselves exclusively the servants of a moral ideal. 
History sometimes is an iron task-mistress. It suf- 
fices — but this is imperative — to direct one's coun- 
try's interests along the channel marked out for the 
life of the nations— of the living nations — and not to 
mistake for that channel certain turbid eddies which 
for a short space of time flow backward between 
slimy banks. 


vi ./;;.-.;:-;:: peerage ' :■ 

In spite of checks and obstacles, we are marching 
forward toward a future of European unity. If proof 
of this were needed, it would be furnished by the hys- 
teria, half real and half assumed, of shortsighted 
materialistic interests, afraid of losses on the ex- 
change, with no more insight than the innkeepers 
and postilions shouting in the 'Forties against the 
construction of railways. Their threats, their hate 
propaganda barely veil their sense of forthcoming 

Thus it has always been in this old world of ours. 
When great national entities have been on the point 
of coalescing, interprovincial hatreds seemed to 
reach their highest paroxysm. At the veiy moment 
when wars of religion were about to vanish forever, 
it seemed as though theological strife had never been 
so acute. The French terrorists gave the impression 
that their riot of carnage would never cease, just 
when the atmosphere was on the point of lightening, 
and life about to become more smiling and humane. 

A century ago, kept in ward on an Atlantic island, 
he who had caused the blood of half Europe to flow 
in sixty battles, knew a moment of sincerity — unique 
in his genius-comedian's career. This was not when 
he dictated the Memorial of St. Helena, which was a 
statement for the defense — nor yet his Will, a set- 
piece for the French people — but when, on the very- 
eve of his death, he summoned his last strength to 
send a final message to his son, with advice drawn 
from his unparalleled reserve of experience. On that 
occasion Bonaparte was, for once, sincere. 

Italian, Corsican, as he had always remained be- 
neath his French veneer, this man was too deeply im- 
bued with family feeling not to be absolutely genuine 



with the one human being he truly loved, his son and 

He wrote : "The aim of all my son's efforts should 
be, to rule by peace. For the future there is only one 
way to convince Europe, and that is, through reason. 
My son should be a man of new ideas. . . . The new 
idea is, to reunite Europe in the bonds of an indis- 
soluble federation. It is in this direction that Europe 
is advancing. To endeavor to retard progress would 
be a waste of strength. It is useless to struggle 
against the inevitable. I cut the Gordian Knot of the 
nations ; now it must be untied. ' ' 

So wrote the dying man. To repeat Bonaparte's 
phrase, the Gordian Knot of the nations was untied 
as a result of the Great War which (in seeming only) 
has given the lie to the Corsican's opinion. Indeed, 
the World War will one day appear merely as the 
culminating proof that we had come to the end of a 
Europe thinking of being able to live outside some 
more or less loose federal bond. 

For all the transitory inconveniences which the 
liberation of nationalities must entail, what matters 
most is that the natural and permanent materials ex- 
ist henceforth of a new organized Europe. That these 
materials have been created, constitutes the redeem- 
ing point of the Versailles Treaty. 

Before the War, there was but one guarantee of a 
common European existence — the equilibrium of the 
Great Powers. The folly of 1914 has proved such an 
equilibrium to be no more than a perilous scaffolding 
— perilous because artificial. 

Caklo Sforza. 

Syosset, Long Island, 
April, 1928. 



I. France and Germany 1 

II. Poland and Germany 17 

III. The Successor States of Austria-Hungary 33 

IV. The Allied Powers and Turkey 51 
V. A European Microcosm 67 

VI. The Roman Catholic Church and European 





Count Sforza's Proposals for the Solution of 

the Upper Silesian Question. 



Anti-Hapsburg Convention, November 12, 




Italo-Czechoslovak Agreement, February 8, 




Italo-Turkish Agreement, March 13, 1921. 



Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Lat- 

via and Esthonia, Nov. 1, 1923. 



Convention of Conciliation and Arbitration 
between Esthonia, Finland, Latvia and 

Poland, January 17, 1925. 



Project of Baltic Protocol, 1925. 



Treaty for the Execution of Customs Union 
between Esthonia and Latvia, February 

5, 1927. 



Letter of Cardinal Gasparri to the Arch- 

bishop of Paris, August 28, 1927. 



Austrian Attempt To Make a Separate 

Peace in 1917. 







I want to examine with you certain outstanding 
moral moments and historical episodes in interna- 
tional European intercourse in the years immedi- 
ately following the signature of the Versailles 
Treaty, and to try to draw from them some lasting 
conclusions and, if possible, some general previsions. 
The events and feelings I am going to deal with still 
belong to our contemporary history. But I hope 
never to lose the only merit I would like to attain for 
my lectures : candid and serene sincerity. When, dur- 
ing the course of our gatherings, I am reluctantly 
obliged to quote my own action or personal recollec- 
tions, it will merely be as a witness. To act otherwise, 
and to commit the sin so common to all politicians — 
that is, to speak of oneself — would be, here in this 
highly intellectual atmosphere, more than indiscreet, 
almost disrespectful to you. You see that even the 
only merit I claim for my lectures draws probably 
its main source from you, my American hearers. 

One who attended the Paris negotiations for the 
Treaty of Versailles and, as in my case, the odd 
dozen of peripatetic meetings of the Supreme Coun- 
cil which, from Boulogne to Spa, from London to 
Cannes, added codicils to and experimented with 
variations of that treaty — such an one may well say 
that he assisted at the Biblical spectacle of the Tower 


of Babel. The meaning of that symbolical myth will 
be illuminated for him with a fresh light. Probably 
the Asiatic Tower of Babel was less babelesque than 
ours, since, as the Bible tells us, the confusion of 
tongues was complete. At any rate, in the Chaldean 
plains they had this advantage, that nobody could 
pretend he was understanding anybody else, and this 
negative knowledge was something gained. 

What made the post- Versailles period morally 
worse, when the Allies remained technically the 
Allies, but differed profoundly in aims and ideas, 
was that all tried to retain in use the same catch- 
words: liberty, independence of peoples, guardian- 
ship of the peace, and the like. Alas, each of these 
had a different meaning according to the national 
language in which it was spoken. Even the word 
"Allies" had a doubtful meaning. It implied, in 
reality, a lot of governments suspicious of each 
other (as, for that matter, has always happened 
after a long coalition), a group of States obliged to 
remain "the Allies" since a convention signed in 
London on September 4, 1914, forced them to keep 
their bond while an enemy remained. And this theo- 
retical enemy remained (the Turk) not because we 
were fighting him, but simply because we never man- 
aged to find, between allies, a common formula for 
peace. It was their disagreement, not their union, 
that forced the Allies to remain allies. That was why 
the confusion of language was so tragic, or tragic 
and comical at once, in old Europe. 

It has become the fashion among those writers 
who criticize with most asperity the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles to discover and to lay stress on the wisdom 
and generosity of the Treaty of Vienna which, a cen- 



tuiy before, ended the Napoleonic wars. In truth, 
such praise has always seemed to me touched with 
unreality, as always happens when one has recourse 
to historical analogies. The work of the Congress of 
Vienna having been directed toward the restoration 
of old dynasties and the preservation of small arti- 
ficial states, consequently crushing the aspiring na- 
tionalities, especially the Italian and German, could 
only be transitory, as reactionary and unnatural 
schemes are bound to be. 

When, half a century later, the Italian provisions 
of the Treaty of Vienna were destroyed (I quote the 
Italian provisions as they were at once the most typi- 
cal and essential part of the treaty), the same powers 
which had arranged together an artificial division of 
my country, a division which, in their shortsighted 
views, ought to have guaranteed European stability, 
suddenly made a discovery. They discovered that the 
disappearance of their Viennese work, far from en- 
dangering a real order, had eliminated from the very 
heart of Europe an always recrudescent cause of 
wars, and had at the same time eliminated mislead- 
ing advantages for some, onerous duties and anxie- 
ties for others. All of them found themselves, after 
1860, — the date of Italian unification, — much nearer 
the real equilibrium they had vainly tried to create in 
Vienna, when they had built on the quicksands of ar- 
tificial diplomacy, with no concern for the national 
realities which had matured during the hard travail 
of the revolutionary years. 

In spite, therefore, of brilliant analogies, more lit- 
erary than real, I cannot agree with the rehabilita- 
tion of the Vienna Congress, though it has found two 
apologists even in Italy, the land which suffered so 


greatly from that treaty, one of those apologists be- 
ing the former Prime Minister Nitti, and the other 
the profound historian of old Rome, Ferrero. 

What I have said so far may seem a digression. 
But I wish to point out as being intimately connected 
with the study of the post- Versailles period the two 
typical and antithetical cases in which, in one in- 
stance, Vienna surpassed Versailles, and, in the 
other, Versailles was morally far ahead of Vienna. 

The point where Vienna scores is the wise gener- 
osity displayed by the victors toward vanquished 
France. You know this as well as I do ; yet I am ac- 
quainted with no recent writings which reproduce, 
in complete antithesis to the decisions of Versailles, 
a document which seems the most conclusive. I mean 
the message issued by the Emperor of Russia on 
March 31, 1814, in the conquered enemy capital, 
Paris. This message says: "The conditions of peace 
were meant to contain stronger guarantees, when 
the question at stake was the suppression of Bona- 
parte's ambitions. When, as now, France, resuming 
a wise government, offers an additional guarantee of 
peace, those conditions must be much more merciful 
to her." The Emperor Alexander, after affirming 
that the Allied Governments would respect French 
integrity, went on to say: "The Allies may go still 
farther, since it is necessary for the good of Europe 
that France should remain strong and great." Here 
indeed we have a language which finds no echo in 
Paris in 1919, although the dossiers of the officials 
at the Quai d'Orsay, the French Foreign Office, are 
all overflowing with historic precedents, a fact 
which, may we note, is not always conducive to the 
quick appreciation of realities by the French. 



The point where, as I told you, Versailles seems to 
me morally so far ahead of Vienna, is one which has 
been sharply criticized, especially by diplomats, one 
which makes this treaty so full of contradictions and 
dubious alternatives. Those contradictions explain 
the hesitating experiences of European diplomacy in 
the years immediately following the treaty. They 
were an actual cause of disturbance and feebleness. 
But, when we look at the whole with an historical 
mind, they really constitute a mark of moral eleva- 
tion, and a possible way to a future better peace. 

The Versailles Treaty might be compared, in due 
measure, to a bronze statue, in whose composition 
two gangs of workmen contributed at the moment of 
fusion, each working independently and each pro- 
vided with quite different materials to be thrown 
into the melting. At the fusion moment, the workmen 
have to act as quickly as possible. So did the negotia- 
tors of Versailles who agreed in one point only — 
that of haste. 

But an initial difficulty held them back. The Treaty 
of Vienna had been speeded up by the fact that the 
armistice convention which had ended the hostilities 
after Napoleon's defeat could be regarded as a genu- 
ine preliminary peace, so identical were the prin- 
ciples first indicated therein with those of the subse- 
quent treaty. On the other hand, in the discussion 
which succeeded the Great War, nothing was more 
irksome to some of the negotiating powers than the 
recollection that the basis of the armistice with Ger- 
many had been indeed no less than Wilson's fourteen 
points. The remembrance of this was so embarrass- 
ing that some wished to forget it ; and I really believe 
that they succeeded in doing so. Such is human na- 


ture, so marvelously resourceful is it when it wants 
to lull itself in oblivion. Maybe life would otherwise 
be unendurable. 

Haste being imperative, and the sole point in 
which the negotiators were in complete accord, they 
strung together article after article, chapter after 
chapter, even ones which were often diametrically 
opposed to each other. Hence ensued a treaty that 
for lack of moral unity, the only unity which has real 
permanent results, was bound to appear, especially 
to an essentially raisonneur people like the French, 
illogical by reason of its contradictions, its occasion- 
ally vague clauses, its more or less voluntary lacu- 

For my part I cannot help seeing something of 
tragic and pathetic beauty in the stand made by one 
of the Paris negotiators against all the rest, who, 
either from motives of vengeance or fear or spirit of 
compromise, admitted huckstering formulae, and 
who were only too glad to have a reason, later on, for 
asking and getting equally tawdry advantages for 
themselves. This solitary man, who lived the whole 
tragedy with his soul as well as with the life he lost 
soon afterward, was forcibly obliged to associate 
himself with the incoherence of Versailles. More- 
over, when he stiffened to his original intentions, as, 
for example, in the question of Fiume, he was mak- 
ing perhaps a graver tactical mistake than by giving 
way. A great European people could not see why 
such intransigence was to be used against them 
alone, and their detennination to guard the Italian 
character of that small town was only increased 

The more the solitary figure yielded to exigencies 



of the moment, the greater grew his determination 
to create a line of escape and a hope of revision, by- 
means of the League of Nations, at all the turning 
points of the treaty. He signed provisory laws to the 
relief of politicians who could not see beyond the 
present or who expected to confine the future in the 
narrow limits of the present. But at the same time he 
signed those laws, he forced his colleagues to sign 
with him a provision for an outlet which would lead 
some day to the revision of what he deemed transi- 
tory compromise. 

The work and the thought of this man are still 
subject for the polemics of the historian, perhaps 
even more in this country than elsewhere. But as a 
foreigner, whose country of all others might seem 
entitled to bear a grudge against him, allow me to 
acknowledge in his solitary struggle toward his soli- 
tary aims a greatness which bears testimony to the 
moral greatness of his race. 

For the world to see the utility of these loopholes 
to necessary revisions, time, the inexorable force of 
time, was wanted; some sterile experiences, like that 
of the Ruhr, were probably needed. On the morrow 
of Versailles it was no use to hope that minds still 
poisoned by the sufferings of the War could envisage 
the practical application of the Wilsonian part of the 
treaty. Corrections were not yet possible. All that 
was generally felt at that time was the disadvantage 
of a treaty full of reservations and contradictions. 

After the Treaty of Vienna, it had been compara- 
tively easy for statesmen and diplomats to work 
together. That treaty was concluded between an anti- 
Bonapartist European coalition and a France her- 
self become anti-Bonapartist. The same was true 


after the Peace of Prague signed in 1866 between 
Prussia and Austria. From such treaties of peace, 
those quoted being but two examples out of many, 
could result only a period of collaboration and of 
understanding between the signatories. 

The Peace of Versailles, by reason of the innate 
contradiction that I have pointed out, did, it is true, 
seal the triumph of the victors, but left the one of 
them nearest to Germany with the bitter sensation 
that this triumph was transitory, that victory would 
have to be rewon over and over again. It was a situa- 
tion to which one needed to become accustomed. In 
course of time it might have been possible to see its 
advantages. But the years immediately following the 
treaty held for those at the head of European affairs 
nothing but uncertainty, equivocation, and contra- 
dictions, real or apparent. 

Even in 1919 and in the two following years, I was 
convinced and said so at the time, that the mass of 
the French, notwithstanding contrary appearances, 
due to what I would venture to call the policy of the 
politicians, were really desirous of a true and lasting 
peace ; in no place in the world was the cry ' ' War to 
end war!" so deeply felt as among the French peas- 
ants who, on the polling day, are the real masters of 
France. But at the same time I felt that the mass of 
the French, either from excess of suffering or from 
want of knowledge, would have resented too strongly 
oversudden and radical transformations, still more 
when brought about by foreign pressure. This is 
the reason that the statesmen who in the various 
Supreme Councils of the time wished to force on 
France a too rapid revision of her judicial positions 
went to work the wrong way and, although sincerely 



desirous of helping France by indicating her best 
course, only made her defiance and bitterness worse. 
I venture to say that better work was done for the 
ripening of mental outlooks in France, by those who 
loyally sided with her in a great number of ques- 
tions, but who gave her a friendly warning when the 
time had really come for her to accept a new situa- 
tion. This, and no other, was the practical way at 
that time to exert over French statesmen an influ- 
ence all the more efficacious in that it was modest and 
not self -advertising. 

What holds good of the central European prob- 
lem, that is the Franco-German problem, holds good 
also with reference to this period, of the interna- 
tional life of the States of Central Europe. The same 
profound contradiction surrounded their origins, 
making it difficult to attain the necessary serenity in 
the diplomatic negotiations which were ruling them. 
Let me explain still further. The destruction of this 
monstrous medieval entity, the Hapsburg monarchy, 
was one of the healthiest results of the great war. 
Forty millions of enslaved races, Czechs, Italians, 
Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, Rumanians, ceased to bow 
before a proud Teuton-Magyar minority, which it- 
self was but the slave of two hundred aristocratic 
ruling families. The addition to the European family 
of those States created after the Austro-Hungarian 
disruption constitutes, together with the resurrec- 
tion of Poland, one of the most definite steps toward 
an essential progress in European life. In fact, an 
inter-European entente was an ideal impossible to 
contemplate, so long as an old artificial State, whose 
motto was ''Divide et impera," still existed. 

A division of Europe on the basis of nationalities 


is but the first step toward an associated Europe. 
Such was Mazzini's doctrine when, a century ago, he 
began his struggle against imperial Austria. A small 
price to pay for such a step forward, is the momen- 
tary diminution of production, such as certain 
gloomy economists enjoy emphasizing. 

But the conflicting elements that perplexed 
Europe with regard to those new States originated 
in the fact that at the Congress, in making use of the 
aforesaid national principle, the treaty-makers suc- 
ceeded in welding together the two habitually op- 
posed ways of thinking. On the cradles of the new 
States Ariel and Caliban were, for once, of one mind. 
Yet the reasons for their agreement were as opposed 
as always. One party wanted to justify a recent war 
cry by the liberation of the enslaved nations. The 
other side desired the creation of the States with a 
fervor all the greater in that these States stood for 
them as sentries alert on guard against a future 
common foe. It looked like a diplomatic application 
of the deep psychological remark of the great Catho- 
lic theologian, St. Thomas Aquinas: "Laudable acts 
committed with dark intentions. ' ' There is, therefore, 
some excuse for the suspicions with which such crea- 
tions, States that recalled to some the waning king- 
doms of that overrated politician Bonaparte, were at 
first regarded. 

It is to the honor of most of these new countries 
that such suspicions soon appeared vain, even to the 
most prejudiced. At the time of which I speak, how- 
ever, some conflicting difficulties seemed very seri- 
ous. I will tell you, in a future lecture, of the difficult 
burden that was laid upon us in the first period after 
the Treaty, by the atmosphere of moral contradic- 



tions which hemmed us in. But, as the chief difficulty 
was — and probably still is — the problem of Franco- 
German relations, I would rather go on now with this 
part of the problem. I had full opportunity of study- 
ing it at first hand, as after being Minister for For- 
eign Affairs at home, I was later an Ambassador in 

Throughout the long-drawn years from the armi- 
stice of 1918 to the elections of May 11, 1924, which 
returned a radical majority to the French Parlia- 
ment instead of the horizon-blue majority elected 
after the victory (so named from the color of the 
army officers uniform), throughout these years 
France was surrounded by an isolation all the more 
painful to her, in that her past history had not accus- 
tomed her to it. Notwithstanding all her deeds, her 
speeches, her attempts at explanations, one word 
was flung back at her from every quarter of the globe 
— militarism. Appearances were against her. But 
how they had come to assume such grave proportions 
is what I will endeavor to explain to you. 

The internal collapse of Germany, and the signing 
of the armistice, ended four of the most terrible 
years in French history. A portion of the country 
yielded to the intoxication of victory, which is so fre- 
quently supported with less dignity than defeat. The 
militarist traditions of ancient France were allied to 
the speculations of politicians who deluded or tried 
to delude themselves as to the permanence of the en- 
tente framework, i.e., of a Europe linked to France 
for the safeguarding of aims appearing to be essen- 
tially French. Such an entente, so they thought "in 
France, should have ensured sufficient pressure be- 
ing brought to bear on Germany to avert financial 


disaster (that fatal consequence of the War), and 
should have averted it by the application of that 
overfacile formula, which in those years was so 
popular in France: "Le Boche paiera!" ("It is for 
the Boche to pay"). But so clear and logical is the 
French mind that, even then, it perceived the ficti- 
tiousness of the plan. Hence resulted those efforts to 
strengthen and fortify their victory at all points, 
which the rest of the world mistook for aggressive 
militarism but which in reality were only impulses 
of self-defense. 

First came the expedition into Cilicia, which swal- 
lowed up milliards of francs, and which was cut 
short, with a remarkable political courage, by a so- 
bered France. Next, the artificial exaggeration of the 
mandate in Syria. Last, the help given to Kolchak's 
enterprises and to the mad adventures of Denikin. 
All of these, which were, no matter whether appro- 
priate or not, only gestures of self-defense, were 
mistaken by Europe for a dangerous imperialism. 

Fortunately for the real and lasting welfare of 
France, all in turn were checked. In Cilicia, France 
risked compromising her relations with Turkey, and 
had to retire under Turkish military attacks, to 
avoid the alternative of war. In Syria the mandate 
she had attempted to enforce by an overcentralized 
system of administration, solely in order to assure 
for herself a military contingent in possible dangers 
to come, had to be rectified and toned down in view 
of ever increasing hostility. Statistics show how far 
this hostility went: French imports to Syria were, 
toward 1922, diminished by over 30 per cent while 
those of Italy were doubled. The Russian enterprises 
ended, we all know how disastrously. As always hap- 



pens in such cases, they achieved the following re- 
sults, antithetical only in appearance: (1) the hatred 
of the Soviet; (2) the resentment of the Czarist ele- 
ments who complained of having received inade- 
quate help; (3) a certain moral strengthening of the 
Soviet regime in Russia, where it appeared to many 
as a national regime menaced from outside. May I 
add that, for having easily prophesied such results I 
was, at the time, looked upon as tainted with Bolshe- 
vistic plague. 

Last, but not least, came the policy of violence 
against beaten Germany. This policy outwardly ap- 
peared to have the whole-hearted support of French 
public opinion. In Europe very rare exceptions, I 
have told you before, maintained the contrary. In 
France the man in the street accepted the policy of 
territorial occupation, believing that Germany did 
not mean to pay, and that it was necessary "lui met- 
tre la main au collet," to use a once famous Briand 
phrase. But when the French masses were at last 
convinced that Germany was prepared to pay the 
reasonable figure to which the claim was eventually 
reduced, and this occurred with the German accept- 
ance of the Dawes plan, the Nationalists immedi- 
ately found themselves isolated. At the end of 1926 
M. Poincare came into power again; but, from the 
point of view of German hatred, what a changed 
Poincare! Germany had begun to pay and the 
French people would no more hear of ' 1 Eternal Ger- 
many," as an enemy always to be hated and mis- 
trusted, but, to quote the new Poincare formula, of 
the "two Germanies." 

Having lived in France as Ambassador, and hav- 
ing since frequently returned to that country ; f amil- 


iar, as I have endeavored to be, with those provincial 
and rural circles with which the frequenter of none 
but aristocratic and intellectual sets fails to reckon, 
I think I am able to state the real condition of the 
French mind after the unhappy episodes of the 
Euhr. After those episodes, I say. Since, before they 
occurred, that great mass, so falsely represented by 
journalism and in particular by Paris literary jour- 
nalism, had some instinctive mistrust for the Ruhr 
experiment. "But," they said, "supposing that the 
thing did come off! Don't let's interfere." 

One is forced to believe that certain mistakes, and 
certain tests, must be undergone by nations. So it 
was perhaps with the Ruhr adventure. But I main- 
tain that the shrewd bulk of the French peasantry, 
whose vote accounts for so much more than any 
nationalistic gossip in Paris salons, had already ad- 
mitted to itself that it would not do for France to 
keep her troops on German soil up till the last pos- 
sible minute permitted by the clauses of the treaty. 
France's nervous fears of Germany's military resur- 
rection, fears which disguised themselves at first, as 
we have seen, in warlike and imperialistic trappings, 
were so alien to the best of French traditions, that in 
the end the country blushed for them. Hence ensued 
the general and sincere acceptance in France of the 
new Locarno policy : even though, as happens after 
the tempest, cross currents and storm eddies would 
seem, sometimes, to indicate the contrary. 

I would go further yet. The ingrained common 
sense of the French, who, despite their revolutions 
remain one of the happy conservative nations, made 
them realize that the addition to the German Gov- 
ernment, in January, 1927, of many Nationalists was 



no real menace to France. The most lasting conces- 
sions are ever those given by an enemy. It is Poin- 
care's last ministry of the Union nationale that has 
given a new force to the policy of conciliation begun 
in 1924 ; and the same thing will probably happen in 
Germany. The French understood this, and knew 
that Hindenburg would be to a Germany bereft of 
the Hohenzollern, what the Orleanist Thiers was to 
the French Republic in 1871. I may without indiscre- 
tion repeat the words spoken to me a few weeks ago 
by one of the most representative German Junkers : 
"We were wrong to put Hindenburg at the head of 
the Reich. With that great wooden statue we have 
sealed the grave from which the Hohenzollern will 
never rise again." Not that excursions and alarms 
between France and Germany are done with — far 
from it! The moderate French views which I have 
shown to you in their intimate reality have not yet 
the appearance of being universal, as practically 
they are, afraid as the French still seem to be of at- 
tacks from those who pretend to embody a superior 

In Germany, on the other hand, some mysterious 
forces within the State must still be reckoned with. 
In both nations, a vague danger is always pending 
that some sincere fanatics, or some newspapers in 
pay of less sincere material interests, may imperil a 
growing entente by acts of violence, or by incidents 
artificially inflated. 

The more we think of the problem, the more, it 
seems to me, we must realize that the interests of 
European peace and of a Franco-German detente, so 
essential to that peace, can best be served, and 
regrettable incidents and disillusionments best be 


averted, in one way only, by going slowly. No sensa- 
tional changes; no problems solved by one single 
concession; at any rate, no imagining or trying to 
make believe that such concessions could miracu- 
lously wipe out from the book of history whole pages 
of grudges, of fears, of misunderstandings. Simpler 
aims are, for practical purposes, sounder and surer ; 
and all efforts should be directed at preparing a radi- 
cal evolution of outlook, such as we believe to be near 
at hand. Of course we all wish diplomatic harmony 
and industrial entente for the two great countries. 
But it is still more to be wished that the rational and 
clear current of French thought, and the dynamic 
force of the German soul may cease to be, intellectu- 
ally and morally, two worlds opposed. 

The real feud between France and Germany has 
its deepest cause in their tremendous mental diver- 
gency. But Goethe, who saw it, also believed in the 
possibility of the gulf being spanned over. What the 
greatest of modern Germans hoped, we may hope. 



If, after having spoken of Franco-German relations, 
I pass at once to the relations between Germany 
and Poland, and to the incidental episodes which 
troubled those relations in the years immediately 
following the Versailles Treaty, it is, as you well 
know, because the Polish policy often seemed in- 
spired by Paris or, at any rate, by feelings and ap- 
prehensions analogous to those of the French. 

The Treaty of Versailles, besides returning Pos- 
nania to Poland, together with the so-called corridor 
extending to Danzig, and transforming Danzig into 
a free city, arranged for plebiscites to decide 
whether Upper Silesia and the territories of Marien- 
werder and Allenstein should belong to Germany or 
to Poland. Three electoral campaigns and three 
plebiscites had to be prepared. It would have taken 
less than that to upset the relations even between 
two countries on the best of terms. 

The Poles are sometimes accused of a feminine 
want of logic. But it must be admitted that DmowsM, 
who with Paderewski represented Poland at the 
Peace Conference, was at least logical in recogniz- 
ing that it was difficult and dangerous alike to cut 
Prussia in two by the insertion of the corridor, and 
an estranged Danzig; only, the remedy he proposed 
to eliminate that danger was simply this : to annex 
East Prussia itself to Poland. Probably Emmanuel 
Kant had not been born in vain at Konigsberg some 


two centuries before, and none of the great Allies 
dared to ignore the intensely German character of 
this part of Prussia ; the logical proposals of Dmow- 
ski were recognized as too logical to be accepted. In 
justice to the Polish politicians we might, however, 
recall the fact that Frederick II was inspired by the 
same "logical" reasons when, on the eve of the first 
partition of Poland, he wrote to his Minister in St. 
Petersburg: "Danzig in herself means nothing to 
me, but she cuts my possessions in half, and so she 
must be made Prussian. ' ' 

Perhaps the corridor was the most dangerous gift 
that any fairy godmother at Versailles could have 
placed in a cradle. It appeared then to more than 
one of us that it would have been wiser to allow to 
Poland a sea-outlet at Memel, through some sort of 
union between Poland and Lithuania, which, at that 
time, it would have been easy to create. 

But one can understand the reasons, the hatreds, 
the illusions, which, coming from certain quarters, 
impelled the creation of the corridor. In any case, if 
the corridor were to create a terrible problem, whose 
solution lay presumably in a far future, the three 
plebiscites were there, on the spot, involving with 
their struggles an immediate state of tension. There 
was this rather paradoxical result, that the very fa- 
vors bestowed on Poland created serious difficulties 
for her in the form in which they were given, just in 
the first days of her independent life, either by pro- 
voking against her a poisonous press campaign, or 
by alarming economic interests involved in the de- 
cisions of the plebiscites. 

That it had been hoped through the two plebiscites 
in Marienwerder and Allenstein to diminish German 



territory, indicates to what point illusions or hatred 
misled men's minds. The immense majority of the 
population was German in the two regions. That was 
not enough. The very day after a terrible war those 
peoples were asked to choose between a country 
where military adventures with Soviet Russia were 
feared, or a country in which the treaty had sup- 
pressed military service. There were many cases of 
Poles in both regions voting for Germany, in order 
to escape military service. The plebiscites in fact 
surpassed German hopes. They were the first cold 
douche which ought to have sobered the extreme 
French nationalists; and, indeed, they made in 
France a deep impression. At Marienwerder, in fact, 
94 per cent voted for Germany, and in Allenstein 97 
per cent, although the population of German nation- 
ality in both regions, great as it really was, was not 
so overwhelming. 

The Inter-Allied Plebiscitary Commission was 
presided over at Marienwerder by the Italians, and 
at Allenstein by the English. At Allenstein the Po- 
lish minority was smaller than at Marienwerder, yet 
it was the Italian administration at Marienwerder 
which Polish criticism, as lively as ill founded, ac- 
cused of favoritism toward the German element. 

The question of the plebiscite, and of the division 
of Upper Silesia, created such a long and important 
European controversy, that it would be quite super- 
fluous to retrace its phases for you, who are thor- 
oughly familiar with this period. I will only recall in 
a few words the origin of the problem. In the first 
draft of the treaty, Upper Silesia had been awarded 
to Poland, because the majority of Silesians were 
Poles. Their nationality had been recognized by the 


official German documents which, before the War, 
had acknowledged more than a million Poles, with- 
out counting the Masurians who are also Slavs, as 
against 800,000 Germans, including military garri- 
sons and functionaries. Germany protested in Paris 
that the Poles in Upper Silesia were as loyal German 
subjects as those of Teutonic blood, and that the 
Silesian coal was a vital necessity for her to continue 
with her industries and to pay the reparations. Lloyd 
George, who had already left far behind him the 
electoral program of December 11, 1918 ("hang the 
Kaiser, squeeze the Germans till the pips squeak," 
etc.), became the champion of the German cause in 
Upper Silesia. Hot discussion ensued; recourse was 
had to a plebiscite. So the plebiscite was held, result- 
ing, in round figures, in 707,000 votes for Germany 
and 479,000 for Poland. You all remember that the 
proportion of votes given differed widely according 
to districts, some of which were practically unani- 
mous for Germany and some for Poland. 

Mr. Lloyd George was aware that I was always 
ready to support any line of action conducive to the 
pacification of Europe. The London Cabinet, there- 
fore, exerted strong pressure on the Roman Cabinet 
for the joint formation of a majority which would 
have established the line of division essentially fa- 
vorable to German industrial claims. At the same 
time, and this was a petty and annoying side of the 
question, Italy received from both German and Pol- 
ish sources tempting proposals with regard to the 
future supply of coal in the case of a favorable Ital- 
ian decision. I was seriously compelled to make it 
clear that such offers could not, at the moment, be 
honorably forwarded. 



I must confess that the recollection of the Spa 
Conference (in the summer of 1920) had left with 
me the impression of a British, and especially a 
Lloyd-Georgian, policy which was rather prejudiced 
against Poland. The Allied ministers had come to- 
gether in the famous Belgian watering place to settle 
the question of reparations, when their whole atten- 
tion was diverted by Bolshevik military threats 
against Poland. Lloyd George suggested the neces- 
sity of an armistice on terms which would have 
seemed very hard to Poland, since by them her army 
would have been compelled to retire before the Eed 
troops. It was in vain that I tried to obtain more fa- 
vorable terms for the Poles. According to informa- 
tion in my possession, it was far from certain that 
Poland would be beaten. But Sir Horace Eumbold, 
the British Minister in Warsaw, assured his Govern- 
ment that the Poles might be considered as doomed. 
Indeed, he left Warsaw with the whole of the diplo- 
matic corps, with the exception of the Italian Minis- 
ter, Tommasini. For his part, M. Millerand (the 
Prime Minister who had represented France at Spa) 
deeply desired to help Poland, but stronger than this 
desire was his distaste for any sort of contact with 
the Bolsheviks, and he remained practically aloof. 
The Polish Minister, Grabski, had to accept the 
measures proposed by Mr. Lloyd George, which I 
had vainly tried to soften for Poland. A few days 
later, that happened which I had deemed possible. 
The Poles were victorious beneath the walls of War- 
saw. Poland's desperate courage had found an in- 
valuable help in General Weygand's strategical ad- 
vice. At the end of August the Russians were in 


It was at the time of the Russian advance that 
Germany and the Soviet Government established a 
series of more or less verbal understanding's with 
each other, for which we in the West have only a few 
fragments of evidence. What leaked out left me with 
the impression that, in case of a Polish defeat at 
Warsaw, an organized revolt was ready to spread in 
Upper Silesia in the summer of 1920, which would 
have been much graver than Korfanty's actual out- 
bursts after the plebiscite. Halfway through August, 
the entire Austro-German press announced, in a soi- 
disant official bulletin, the capture of Warsaw by the 
Bolsheviks. Instantly, at Kattowitz and in other 
towns of Upper Silesia, a simultaneous revolt broke 
out against the Poles and against the Franco-Italo- 
British troops. 

Count Oberndorf, the German representative at 
Warsaw, returned thither from Berlin, on the eve of 
what seemed to him the inevitable fall of the Polish 
capital, and handed to the Polish Government a note, 
whose subject was the dangers to which the Russian 
advance was exposing those German populations 
which had been delivered over to Poland by the 
Treaty of Versailles. This note could have only one 
practical aim, that of paving the way for an eventual 
German occupation, if the Russian advance into Pol- 
ish territory should be completed, a German occupa- 
tion which even France would have had to condone 
in order to ward off the Red peril. It may be added 
that such an occupation had probably already re- 
ceived Russian sanction. Such an event had been 
foreshadowed at the time of the Russian advance on 
Poland, when the Russians signalized their entry 
into each village by founding a Soviet there, except 



in Soldau, the only town of the corridor to be occu- 
pied by them. There, the administration of the town 
was entrusted to German residents, and no Soviet 
was created. We may ask whether Russia had 
pledged herself to such a course of action by some 
secret understanding with Germany. Every hypothe- 
sis is permissible. We may even have come very 
close to assisting at a fourth partition of Poland, 
with the probable acquiescence of all Western Eu- 
rope, if thereby a Bolshevik advance could have been 

But in dealing with history, it is futile to recon- 
struct possibilities, such as Pascal's speculations on 
the length of Cleopatra's nose. Enough for us here 
to note that both parties in Upper Silesia were effec- 
tively prepared for violent action. Why did violence 
break out on the Polish side only, by means of the 
armed bands and organizations under Korfanty's 
orders? We must, in justice, admit that the Polish 
disillusionment caused by the fact that Poland had a 
minority in the plebiscite was not in itself enough to 
let loose a revolt. Another occurrence provoked it. 

The three Allied Commissioners representing 
France, Italy, and Great Britain in Upper Silesia 
had not managed to agree directly after the plebi- 
scite on a formula to be submitted to the Allied gov- 
ernments. According to the treaty, this should have 
been done. General Le Rond, the French Commis- 
sioner wished, in spite of the plebiscite, to give all to 
Poland; the British Commissioner, Colonel Perci- 
val, wanted all for Germany, notwithstanding the 
formal decisions of the treaty concerning the appli- 
cation of the plebiscite. Then, without instructions 
from their governments, the Italian and the British 


Commissioners thought it best to take it upon them- 
selves to formulate the proposal of delimitation 
which had been decreed by the Treaty of Versailles. 
The Englishman gave up the idea of handing over 
everything to Germany, the Italian admitted that 
Germany must have the industrial zone, and Poland 
the non-industrial. 

What would have been the result of this division 
in accordance with the plebiscite which, according to 
the treaty, was to decide the line of demarcation in 
Upper Silesia? We have here one of the most typical 
cases of collective postwar blindness. Even today, 
Germany persists in regarding the loss of part of 
Upper Silesia not only as a material and moral loss, 
which would be quite natural on her part, but as a 
flagrant injustice, violating the clauses of the treaty 
in order to harm Germany. 

Now, what did the treaty say on this subject? 
Simply as follows, in Art. 88 : 

Germany hereby renounces in favour of Poland all rights 
and title over the portion of Upper Silesia lying beyond the 
frontier line fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers as the result of the plebiscite. 

And how, according to the treaty, was that formally 
imposed division to be arranged? This was decided 
by Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Art. 88 : 

On the conclusion of the voting, the number of votes cast 
in each commune will be communicated by the Commission 
to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, with a full 
report as to the taking of the vote and a recommendation as 
to the line which ought to be adopted as the frontier of Ger- 
many in Upper Silesia. In this recommendation regard will 



be paid to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the 
vote. . . . 

Now, by carrying out the plan of the two Commis- 
sioners, Poland would only have received 20 per cent 
of the population and 25 per cent of the communes, 
whereas the plebiscite — the basis of division as laid 
down by the treaty — had shown that 40 per cent of 
the population and 45 per cent of the communes 
wished to be Polish. 

The Commissioners' proposal was regarded by 
the leaders of the Polish movement in Upper Silesia 
as a proof that the majority of the Powers, Great 
Britain and Italy, were definitely pledged to a for- 
mula disregarding the results of the plebiscite. They, 
therefore, thought that force alone could help them, 
and the insurrectionary movement broke out. Gen- 
eral Le Rond had already left for France, which 
proved to me that he knew what was coming, and, as 
President of the Inter-Allied Commission, did not 
wish to have to suppress in that capacity a revolt 
which had his sympathy. As a Frenchman he proba- 
bly shared the current French illusion that, once the 
Silesian mineral resources had been taken away 
from Germany, the latter would in the future be 
unable to create such a mighty arsenal as heretofore. 

The revolt broke out at the time when we were in 
London for a Supreme Council, to discuss repara- 
tions and the Eastern question. On the way home 
from the Council, stopping in Paris for a few hours, 
I spoke of Poland with M. Briand. I told him that 
the Poles should instantly cut short a movement 
which had already cost the lives of some twenty Ital- 


ian soldiers, victims to duty ; J and that, if this were 
done, I should continue to favor an equitable appli- 
cation of the plebiscite. M. Briand then showed me 
telegrams informing Mm that the French had also 
sustained losses, and he appeared to appreciate my 
suggestion that the contents should be made public, 
so as to show that more than one Allied contingent 
had suffered ; but, once I had left for Rome, he, for 
psychological reasons, kept silent. 

In order to demonstrate that I could not permit 
further disorders and fresh Italian casualties, I re- 
called the Italian Minister to Warsaw, Tommasini, a 
valued diplomat whose book on Poland is a standard 
work. I also insisted upon the dismissal of the Polish 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pilz, who in 
an interview with a French journalist had declared 
that the Italian losses were due to the obstinacy with 
which our troops had tried to disarm the insurgents. 
The fact in itself was quite honorable for Italy, but a 
high Polish official should have spoken in a different 
tone on such a subject. Meanwhile, Pilsudski at War- 
saw expressed his sorrow for the Italian casualties, 
and admitted that the Italian contingent had done 
their duty nobly. Korfanty himself expressed regret, 
and gratitude, toward Italy, large indemnities were 
allocated, and the incident closed. 

After these events, Lord Curzon asked my per- 
sonal opinion as to how the division of Poland should 
have been effected after the plebiscite. I then formu- 
lated a series of proposals which were discussed 

1 It was because of these Italian casualties that two years later, 
being Ambassador in Paris, I vetoed the granting of an Italian 
decoration to General Le Rond. 



throughout Europe as "the Sforza line." 2 Such a line 
never really existed. I studied on the one hand the 
results of the plebiscite, and on the other the configu- 
ration of the territory, and, far from drawing up one 
of those vague formulae which are the last resort of 
diplomacy, I, on the contrary, showed the practical 
results which would actually be achieved on the spot. 
More than a "Sforza line," it was the exclusion of 
all other lines for which, arguing from my premises, 
no valid excuse could be found. 

To my satisfaction, the Giolitti-Sforza Cabinet 
resigned in the summer of 1921. The Allies having 
failed to agree, the League of Nations was charged 
with finding a solution for the Polish problem. I 
quote the exact text of the decisions of the League of 
Nations Council on October 12, 1921, in which it de- 
clared that it would "assign to each State a number 
of electors not differing appreciably from the total 
number of votes given in its favor, and which would, 
at the same time, as far as possible equalize and re- 
duce the minorities." So, by carrying out the prin- 
ciple which had always been mine, the same results 
as mine were at last unavoidably reached. No other 
course remained open to the League of Nations but 
to retrace "the Sforza line." 

1 must admit that, although temperamentally in- 
different (too much so, perhaps) to outside opinion, 
I was amused two months later by an encounter on 
the Eiviera with one of the most eminent members 
of the Council, who, being not without humor, con- 
fided to me: "Your line has been a nuisance to us! 
German propaganda had so stirred up public opin- 
ion against it that, while we wanted to do justice to 

2 See Document I, p. 99. 


the claims of nationality, and interfere as little as 
possible with the industrial life of the country, we 
had at the same time to appear to strike out a new 
line for ourselves, a Geneva discovery. Our secre- 
taries worked again and again on studies and classi- 
fications, but, from wherever they started out, they 
always had to come back to the troublesome Sforza 

Although many of you are doubtless as cognizant 
of the matter as myself, it was necessary to recall to 
your memory this episode of Upper Silesia, which 
took up two years of European polemics, and is 
probably not yet done with, because we may draw 
from it some thoughts worth retaining. 

The reasons which dictated my conduct belonged 
to three different groups. First, a general considera- 
tion: duty impelled us, as we have just now seen, 
honestly to apply the clauses of the treaty once the 
plebiscite had taken place. It was imperative that 
neither of the two sides should have serious cause to 
feel wronged. The offers which we received from 
both to secure our help, offers frequently renewed to 
myself, foolish and indiscreet as they were, might 
have had the result of forcing on us the strictest ap- 
plication of the clauses of the treaty. A second con- 
sideration was dictated to me by the thought of our 
most sacred traditions. Was it possible for an Ital- 
ian, conscious of his country's tragic history, to ex- 
clusively accept a thesis grounded on such reasoning 
as this ? ' ' Every industrial region must go over to the 
country on which it economically depends, for the 
good of economic production throughout Europe." It 
was against such materialistic reasonings that Italy 
was reconstituted in 1860, after four centuries of for- 



eign invasion, on the strength of one essential prin- 
ciple, that of nationality. Never, and nowhere, would 
it be possible for her to go against that principle. An 
Italian could not forget that the same train of reason- 
ing as that which was invoked by Germany for Upper 
Silesia was, in the Great War, employed against us 
by the Central Empires in their propaganda, namely, 
that Trieste was more useful as an Austrian port; 
that the Trentino completed satisfactorily the eco- 
nomic region of the Austrian Alps ; that its vine- 
yards and its orchards would only be useless to 
Italy. Yet Battisti, the member to the Austrian 
Reichsrath for Trent, forgot, small Trentino land- 
holder that he was, that his apples would fetch a 
higher price in Vienna than in Rome, when he gave 
up his life that his dead body (he was hanged in 
Trent) might consecrate the Italian character of his 
native region. 

A third reason also was in my mind, though I must 
confess that events do not so far appear to have 
justified it. I continue, however, to believe that much 
truth lay behind it. Let us admit at the outset that 
the Polish Government has not been fortunate in its 
administration of that portion of Upper Silesia al- 
lotted to it by the League of Nations. The elections of 
November 14, 1926, do not show a sensible increase 
of Polish adherents since the plebiscite of 1921, and 
this although German functionaries of every order 
have been replaced by Poles. These elections even 
show, on the eastern borders of the Reich, a most im- 
portant frontier-zone from the industrial point of 
view, that the German or pro-German minority is 
now higher than the former forty per cent of the 
plebiscite, in spite of the German officials ' departure. 


The Polish-German diplomatic tension has increased 
the local difficulties of an administration bound to be 
inferior to that of Germany. In one sense, German 
propaganda now has a greater force of argument 
than before, since it can prove this bit of lost terri- 
tory (once supported by German capital and brains) 
to be losing annually some of its riches and some of 
its prosperity under Polish domination. Propaganda 
can also make use of the high price of living, lowness 
of salaries, and unemployment dole. 

But when we were about to hand over this terri- 
tory to Poland, I felt entitled to think that, with a 
little mutual good will, Upper Silesia might come to 
be a link between the two States ; in fact, a collabora- 
tion on the basis of common economic solidarity 
seemed necessary. When I enlarged on this theme to 
those in authority in Poland, they appeared to take 
in my ideas. One, who, for fear of exposing him to 
the overheated nationalistic rancor of his country- 
men, shall be nameless, even went so afar as to say 
to me, "Yes, I see that between us Poles and Ger- 
mans it is absolutely necessary to arrive at a sort of 
common exploitation." This did not come to pass, 
yet there was no reason why it should not have been, 
should not yet be, some day. If the new tendency of 
Franco-German policy is confirmed, a policy of col- 
laboration between Germany and Poland may be 
fraught with fewer difficulties. Indeed, it would be 
useless to have concluded a pact on the Rhine, if 
seeds of violence still germinated upon the banks of 
the Vistula. 

The resurrection of Poland constitutes one of the 
brightest moral lights in the Versailles Treaty. But 
Poland, through no fault of her own, still suffers 



from having become a great country too rapidly, and 
through an external miracle. True wisdom would for 
the present, at any rate, lead her to emulate the 
French statesman who, when a friend questioned him 
after the Terror, "What have you been doing all this 
time?" replied, with naked simplicity, "I have 

A terrible problem certainly divides Germany and 
Poland, not that of Upper Silesia, but the corridor. 
Yet we must remember in this connection that the 
best work for European peace is not always done by 
those who angrily denounce injustice, demanding 
that the treaties which caused it be formally revised. 
No, in the interest of peace, it would be sufficient to 
interpret the treaties and slowly find out new appli- 
cations and compromises. As for the spirit in which 
this work should be approached, we may find ex- 
amples even in nineteenth century Germany. Ger- 
many ensured her power, her prosperity, and her fu- 
ture at two stages of the Bismarckian period. First, 
when the Chancellor, in spite of King William's 
wishes, declined to take an inch of Austrian territory 
after the Austrian defeat of 1866, and so gained a 
prolonged alliance with that country. Again, when 
the same Chancellor, content to have continental su- 
premacy, refused to hear a word about the empire of 
the seas. The unhappy neurasthenic who drove him 
out, and who was himself his own Chancellor, did 
not possess the wisest of political gifts, I mean the 
sense of limitation, hence his downfall. 

We may sometimes wonder whether the last of the 
Hohenzollerns and the rhetorical "iron fist" and 
"dry powder" Germany he impersonated and, we 
believe, falsified, are not going to take a strange 


revenge on some of Germany's neighbors. This re- 
venge might be the revival among those neighbors of 
that militaristic overbearingness and nationalistic 
conceit which brought upon her, through the fault of 
her blind leaders, so hard a visitation. 



Lord Salisbury used to say that the chief respon- 
sibility for all the silly things said or thought about 
the gravity of Anglo-Russian relations lay with the 
geographical atlas, which gave the impression to the 
casual observer that the Russian bear was waiting 
round the corner, scarcely concealed behind some 
mountains, for the chance to stride across them and 
to hurl himself upon India. 

It would not surprise me if a like simplicity of 
conception had helped to create that nostalgia for a 
lost Austria-Hungary which it has been the fash- 
ion latterly to cherish in Europe. Men of mature age 
had, many of them, grown used to seeing on the map 
a vast, unicolored blot, joining itself to those others 
which symbolized Russia, Germany, and Italy. To 
the south lay lesser barred stains of color, Serbia, 
Rumania, and others, and from their direction used 
to come rumors of war and uprisings. Small wonder 
if, watching the barred stains spread northward, 
amid the complications of a postwar period, p sharp- 
ened regret was felt for the appearance of solidity 
which had formerly been presented by the Hapsburg 

Other psychological elements, more serious if 
equally illusory, have gone to form, all over Europe, 
a kind of posthumous benevolence toward Austria- 
Hungary. In the first place, there is the Church of 
Rome. The Vatican knew well enough how little true 


Christianity, or even Catholicity, lay behind the out- 
ward pietism of the monarchy, of the aristocracy, of 
the bureaucratic government. Austria-Hungary re- 
mained, however, the single great state whose sov- 
ereign, annually, on the first Sunday in June, fol- 
lowed bareheaded the solemn procession of Corpus 
Christi, as it wound through the streets of his capital 
for hour after hour. The Roman Church was aware 
that so much external homage must frequently be 
paid for by her in a servile obedience to Austrian 
governmental interests, in painful compromises in 
Albania and the East, where even her own claims 
sometimes had to yield before those which the Am- 
bassador of Francis Joseph imperiously imposed. 
But these unfortunate incidents occurred in secret; 
the external prestige was all the Church's. And, 
above all, that Church disliked the successors. It was 
felt in the Vatican that John Huss, burnt alive by 
order of the Council of Constance, had suffered also 
as promoter of the national Czech spirit, as the spir- 
itual hero of Bohemia. The entire work of de-nation- 
alizing Bohemia had been accomplished, under the 
Empress Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II, by 
the creation of a new Austrian aristocracy recruited 
from among adventurers of Flanders, France, and 
Italy, who had hired themselves out to the Empire, 
and who received their new Czech fiefs on one condi- 
tion, fidelity to Vienna and suppression of all efforts 
at a Slav resurrection. In this work the fief-holders 
had the constant support of the Catholic bishops. 
These are inflictions and sufferings not easily for- 
gotten. When, in fact, the memory of the national 
hero, Huss, was celebrated at Prague two years ago, 


the ceremonies were not long in assuming an anti- 
Catholic appearance. 

In France also there was a strong Austrophile 
tradition; not among the people, conscious of no 
such bond, but in the aristocratic salons as well as in 
the studies of certain diplomats. It was more from 
snobbery than from any other motive; it helped 
them to play at politics, not to pursue politics them- 
selves. The last Empress of Austria had been born a 
Bourbon princess, of the Italianized branch of the 
old dukedom of Parma, indeed, but none the less a 
descendant of Louis XIV. One of her brothers had 
established himself in France, where he had married 
a bride of the French aristocracy, and where he was 
displaying a keen French patriotism. It was this 
young gentleman, the "dear Sixtus," to whom 
Charles, Emperor of Austria, turned in 1917 to try 
and conclude a separate peace. It was proposed to 
France that she should betray her treaties with 
Italy. Painful uncertainty ensued, but the sentiment 
of French honor was stronger than diplomatic calcu- 
lations, and the offer was rejected. 1 The cunning Aus- 
trian proposal had provoked painful uncertainty. 
This was among certain ranks of French diplomacy, 
touched by temptation in one of its oldest and dear- 
est traditions ; but even those diplomats, to their 
honor be it said, refrained from entering a sphere 
where the word, that is, the dignity, of France would 
have lost so much. 

Of what did those traditions and temptations con- 
sist? Of this : that French diplomacy sometimes pays 
the penalty for having an almost too finished histori- 
cal and political culture. I have often fancied that 

1 See Document X, p. 125. 


the pigeonholes of the Quai d'Orsay must each con- 
tain, ready to hand, a copy of the Peace of Westpha- 
lia, the ideas of which, inspired as they were by the 
period corresponding to the end of the Thirty Years' 
War (1648), still seem to have some part in direct- 
ing the trend of French political thought. The West- 
phalian idea was to keep the Germanic race broken 
up in fragments; what a temptation, then to make 
use of an Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which might 
eventually have absorbed Bavaria and other coun- 
tries of the Reich, on the strength of its Catholic 
characteristics. As frequently happens, even the 
great newspapers gave the impression of sharing 
these illusions, blind terrors and pleasant lies being 
the alternate menu of the upper classes' daily intel- 
lectual food. A most unique and certainly the most 
courageous exception was the old Journal des Debats 
which strongly denounced the vain hopes of playing 
Austria against Germany and, by doing so, served 
the interests and the honor of France as well as the 
Italian national cause. 

I have sometimes frankly discussed these retro- 
spective but still ticklish questions, thanks to a 
friendship wherein numerous actions had rendered 
graceful phrases unnecessary on my part, with those 
among French statesmen who had a secret weakness 
for Austria at the bottom of their hearts. One of 
them was Paul Deschanel, whom I saw frequently 
after his resignation as President of the Republic. 

"Leaving aside," I used to tell them, "the rights 
of nationality, the feelings of Italy, the consequent 
alienation of Italian, Serb, and Rumanian sympa- 
thies, apart from all this, you would have based your 
chief support on artificial and unsound construe- 


tions. Think, for example, of one who, for all his ner- 
vous lack of equilibrium, was no common mind, the 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg 
throne, who was assassinated at Serajevo, what was 
the aim and object of his 'Trialism'? The only way 
out for Austria, but also her complete abdication as 
a Germanic power. ' ' 

These doubts were comprehended ; yet, in politics 
hatred is stronger than friendship, and the hatred 
felt for Germany was a blinding force in some cases. 
Hence it may be concluded (in parentheses) that a 
sane policy of Franco-German rapprochement, far 
from injuring French intimacy with the Successor 
States of Austria, as certain polemists claim, would 
only ensure it more firmly. 

In view of this persistence of certain longings and 
regrets in Europe, even if these were psychological 
rather than political, and considering also the pres- 
ence in Switzerland of the ex-Emperor Charles, 
claimant to the Hungarian throne, it was natural 
that the Successor States should have become con- 
scious of common ties which presently developed 
into the Little Entente. 

The first diplomatic act marking their union was 
the Czecho-Yugoslav Convention signed in Belgrade 
on August 14, 1920, by M. Benes, Czechoslovak Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Ninchich, Yugoslav 
Minister of Commerce, then in charge of the Minis- 
try for Foreign Affairs in the absence of its titular 
head, M. Trumbich. Three men, they were, who had 
too long suffered personally under Austria not to 
agree quickly on a common defensive action in the 
event of attack from Hungary, prepared to take back 
Charles of Hapsburg as her king. The convention, 


indeed, only envisaged an unprovoked attack on the 
part of Hungary, but those who signed the conven- 
tion knew, even then, that the links which they were 
then forging were destined to have a wider diplo- 
matic outcome. 

Immediately afterward, in Belgrade itself, M. 
Benes made a declaration to a press representative 
which showed clearly the trend of the new pact. Let 
me quote it verbatim, convinced as I am that semi- 
official words, so long as they are authentic, contain 
more of the breath of life than correct and proper 
diplomatic statements. 

"We have no intention whatever," said the Czech 
Minister, "of launching into external adventures, 
but our wish, once our internal consolidation is ac- 
complished, is to profit therefrom to collaborate with 
the Entente for a definite restoration of general 
peace. This was the object of my journey. We want 
a policy of wide horizons aiming at the stabilization 
of Central Europe. Such a policy is advantageous to 
the Allies, since it reinforces their authority. We are 
equally glad to prove to those who regret the dis- 
memberment of Austria, or dream of a Confedera- 
tion of the Danube, that Central and South-eastern 
Europe can perfectly well consolidate itself by 
means of a direct Entente between the principal suc- 
cessors to the Dual Monarchy. We have one especial 
aim besides, which is to bring home to the Magyars 
that they must learn wisdom, and cease to be a hot- 
bed of unrest. Here also, we are guided, not by self- 
ish national interests, but by those of European 
peace which we are taking in hand. ' ' 

European diplomacy gave different and opposite 
interpretations to the creation of the Czecho-Yugo- 


slav group, attributing it, according to individual 
tastes or suspicions, to French or Italian influence. 
In Poland, for example, the treaty was believed to 
have been concluded under my influence, I being then 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, which justified a cer- 
tain attitude of reserve for fear of displeasing Paris. 
In point of fact (to the highest possible credit of two 
ministers whose countries were not among the Great 
Powers) these ministers had acted independently of 
all foreign influence, their conduct being dictated 
solely by the political and historical aspect of the 
situation, as viewed by their consciences and their 
patriotism. Later, I will speak of the only sense in 
which I may have influenced the signing of the con- 
vention, by the conversations which I had had a 
month before (July, 1920,) at Spa, during the Inter- 
Allied Conference, with M. Trumbich, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. 

But, keeping for the moment only to those exter- 
nal events which dictated to the two countries such 
measures of precaution as they took, let us recall the 
following : Hungary had never ceased to exploit the 
fact that fairly important Magyar minorities, satu- 
rated with an admirable and fervent patriotism, had 
been absorbed into the new neighboring States; 
more than 300,000 Magyars, indeed, had passed into 
Yugoslavia, more than half a million into Rumania, 
and 600,000 into Czechoslovakia. A clandestine 
propaganda emanating from Budapest kept up the 
unrest among these minorities. It must be admitted 
that the Successor States would have been better ad- 
vised to try to reduce the minorities to the lowest 
figure compatible with sure and logical frontiers, in- 
stead of pandering to land-hunger, and to a spirit of 


vengeance directed at the haughty race which had 
held them in submission for centuries. This secret 
Magyar propaganda took the most varied forms ; for 
instance, a violent outbreak at Sabolitza in April, 
1920, was fomented by Magyar nationalist elements, 
joined for that end to communist elements. Certain 
other associations, such as "The Awakening Mag- 
yars," while they did not stoop to complicity with 
communists, yet maintained a continuous stream of 
agents and spies, coming and going all about the an- 
cient territory of St. Stephen's crown. 

This campaign for the reconquest of old frontiers 
went hand in hand with that of the monarchists. Im- 
possible that it should have been otherwise. On leav- 
ing Austria, after his defeat in Italy, the Emperor 
Charles had merely signed a paper declaring his 
royal powers in Hungary to be suspended. This was 
not an act of abdication. Moreover, to be valid ac- 
cording to Magyar law, it should have been counter- 
signed by the Hungarian Prime Minister and then 
registered by Parliament. These formalities had not 
been carried out, and they were a living thing in 
Hungary, where by an old medieval tradition it was 
still held that the material crown placed on the 
King 's head at his coronation was an integral neces- 
sity for the completion of his royal right. According 
to the Hungarian legitimists, it followed that, 
Charles not having signed the peace treaties, his 
sovereignty extended over those territories which 
the Rumanians, the Yugoslavs, and the Czechs held 
by a might which was not fully right. 

In the summer of 1920, those currents of French 
feeling to which I have already alluded as intensely 
favorable to the reconstitution of Hapsburg power 


were strengthened by two elements. First, by the 
fear of Bolshevism, which led to the belief that a 
feudal and monarchical Hungary might be a sure 
rampart against it, a rather arbitrary conception, 
since the Serbian peasants, for example, all of them 
democrats and all small landowners, are assuredly 
at least as safe from any germ of Bolshevism as 
some of the Hungarian agricultural proletariat. Sec- 
ondly, the fact that at the beginning of Horthy's 
regime, English and French capitalists had invested 
large sums in important Hungarian business, and 
that, consequently, as well as through the newspa- 
pers which they controlled, they were in process of 
rekindling ancient Magyar sympathies. Already, 
through these foreign interests, the headquarters of 
the Inter-Allied Danube Commission had been fixed 
in Budapest, instead of Galatz in Rumania, or Pres- 
burg in Czechoslavakia. 

Against these and other symptoms of British and 
French indifference the Czech and Yugoslav states- 
men, at the time could count only on my open sym- 
pathy for any course of action opposed to the dan- 
gers of any sort of Hapsburg restoration. 

I will be brief at this point, wishing to speak as 
little as possible of myself and only when it is un- 
avoidable to make clear the links of the events. 

At the Spa Conference, I had particularly earnest 
talks with the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, M. Trumbich. You all know that the Adriatic 
question had, up till then, entailed a lengthy and bit- 
ter series of polemics. Now, our conversations held 
a new note. I told M. Trumbich, whom I had known 
in Corfu during the War, and of whose anti-Aus- 
trian feeling I was absolutely sure, that I was not 


unaware of all the difficulties entailed by past events 
upon my present course of action; but that I was 
prepared to brave any unpopularity in the lasting 
interests of Italy ; that the Government of Belgrade 
was confronted, in the Giolitti-Sforza Cabinet, by a 
strong Government ready to act, to take decisions, 
and to assume responsibilities ; but that I could not 
accept the territorial bases agreed to by my prede- 
cessors, according to which the frontier-line passed 
within ten kilometres of Trieste. Those pourparlers 
I should consider as not having occurred. The Bel- 
grade Government must realize that I should have 
proved inflexible as to the necessity of a complete 
Alpine frontier, with the "Massif" of Nevoso in 
Italian hands ; but that, on the other hand, I should 
have treated with Belgrade in a novel spirit of col- 
laboration and understanding; and that our diplo- 
matic union might have proved valuable against all 
danger of an artificial Austro-Hungarian recon- 
struction coming from no matter what source. Bel- 
grade understood this novel language, which paved 
the way for the Treaty of Rapallo, signed by us on 
November 12, 1920, ensuring to Italy the complete 
Alpine frontier. 

To this precedent I alluded, in mentioning previ- 
ously that the Czech and Yugoslav statesmen knew 
that my full sympathy could be gained for their joint 

This work of theirs was continued at Eapallo, for, 
on the same day as the two delegations signed the 
treaty which ensured to Italy the Alps, the whole of 
Istria, Zara, the islands of Cherso, Lussin, and other 
lesser isles, and also ensured the Italian character of 
Fiume joined to Italian territory, with a privileged 


rule for Italians living in Dalmatia, the three Italian 
plenipotentiaries and the three Yugoslav plenipo- 
tentiaries put their signatures to an anti-Hapsburg 
convention. 2 

1 quote from this convention the following arti- 
cles : 

1. The two Governments pledge themselves jointly to take 
all political measures calculated to prevent the restora- 
tion of the House of Hapshurg either to the throne of 
Austria or that of Hungary ; 

2. The two Governments pledge themselves to afford, each 
to the other, such diplomatic assistance as is most suit- 
able to attain the above aim ; 

3. The two Governments pledge themselves to mark all ac- 
tivities directed against their reciprocal safety, whether 
coming from Austrian or from Hungarian territory, and 
to that end they will maintain the closest possible contact 
with each other. 

Another article added : 

The Italian Government, which has learned with satisfac- 
tion the understanding established between the Serb-Croat- 
Slovene Government and the Czechoslovak Government 
(exclusively with the same object as the present Agree- 
ment), and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, will bring 
this convention to the knowledge of the Czechoslovak Gov- 

As you see, this convention was conceived in the 
same spirit as that at Belgrade three months earlier 
between the Czechs and the Serbs. Only the hy- 
pothesis of a war was no more in question. From the 
moment when Italy entered the lists, such an hy- 

2 See Document II, p. 101. 


pothesis became a practical impossibility. Hungary 
would never have ventured upon war. Successive 
Italian Governments have renewed more or less 
analogous engagements in new forms since then. It 
could not have been otherwise. 

Although there was at that time, in Italy, an at- 
tempt by certain parties and newspapers to show 
that the Little Entente, in addition to various other 
more or less imaginary misdeeds, contained the em- 
bryo danger of a federated union to reconstitute 
Austria-Hungary in a new shape, the fact was, and 
still remains, overevident: (1) that the Successor 
States had too great a love for their newly regained 
independence to sink it in any kind of federation 
which might be obnoxious to Italy; (2) that a Hun- 
garian state of some twenty million inhabitants, in- 
cluding a Croatia detached from Yugoslavia and 
gravitating perforce toward the Upper Adriatic to 
menace the Italian character of Fiume, would have 
constituted for Italy a more trying alternative to a 
Yugoslav state, the center of which is a Serbia ever 
more drawn toward the Lower Adriatic and the 
Aegean, a deadly enemy, moreover, of old Hapsburg 
institutions, whose disappearance was, for Italy, 
the sovereign gain of the War. 

M. Benes, one of the most intelligent ministrants 
to European peace, came to see me in Rome at the 
beginning of February, 1921. We had on this occa- 
sion an exchange of letters. 3 Those instruments 
brought Czechslovakia into the sphere of action of 
the anti-Hapsburg convention. 

At the end of March, 1921, there followed Charles 

3 See Document III, p. 102. 


of Hapsburg's first attempt to return to Hungary. 
You are too familiar with the diplomatic history of 
these last few years for me to enlarge upon the de- 
tails of this lamentable venture. I merely wish to 
testify, from my own accurate recollections of the 
moment, that the great Magyar peasant majority 
was adamant to the ex-King's appeal. He was sur- 
rounded only by the loyalty, sometimes sincere and 
admirable, but sometimes assumed for material in- 
terests, of certain great families, who had all to gain 
by consolidating their ancient feudal and patrimo- 
nial privileges through the King's return. The Cabi- 
nets of Rome, Belgrade, and Prague acted in perfect 
accord, and with great rapidity. Admiral Horthy's 
government wisely realized that Charles must be 
sent back, if fatal consequences were to be averted; 
and the ex-King returned to Switzerland. 

A certain small incident now occurred. Prague and 
Belgrade were convinced that Charles would cer- 
tainly repeat his attempt; and they wished to take 
steps at Berne with regard to him. The Swiss Gov- 
ernment being extremely sensitive, and justly so, 
concerning its right of asylum, I was asked to inter- 
pret, in a courteous manner, the feelings shared by 
us all, including myself, in this matter. The Federal 
Government sent me the reply that it would demand 
of Charles his word of honor not to make a second 
attempt. I answered that he would give his word, but 
that on the first occasion he would be obliged by his 
entourage to break it. This remark caused some 
scandalized feelings among the republicans of the 
Federal Council, yet a few months later they were 
forced to see that I was right. 

A conference of the Successor States of Austria 


now assembled at the Chigi Palace in Rome, under 
my presidency, and in an atmosphere of trust and col- 
laboration. Those economic questions which existed 
between our respective countries were to be dis- 
cussed at it. "We will prove to all Europe," I de- 
clared in my opening address, ' ' and prove it with the 
matchless eloquence of facts, that in existing society 
it is impossible to conceive an economic state of real 
well-being not indissolubly joined to the well-being 
of our neighbors." These are overevident truths 
today ; in 1921 they were suspiciously criticised. 

A new link of the Little Entente was forged on 
August 23, 1921, and on the fifth of June following, 
by two treaties which, in the same spirit as their 
forerunners, allied Rumania with Czechoslovakia 
and with Yugoslavia, respectively. M. Take Jonescu, 
the lamented Rumanian statesman, had previously 
informed me of the shaping of these treaties, asking 
my advice and my assent, which, of course, were 
given with cordiality and sincerity. 

Another treaty had been signed in March, 1921, but 
one which did not precisely fit into the framework of 
the Little Entente. I refer to the Polish-Rumanian 
Treaty guaranteeing reciprocal help in the event of 
attack by Russia. Those conversant with popular 
feeling in Serbia and in Czechoslovakia know how 
impossible it would be for either country to enter 
upon a treaty hostile to Russia, whether under Bol- 
shevik rule or no. 

Poland, meanwhile, was not opposed to a system 
of relations based upon the wish to suppress all at- 
tempts at restoring the former State of Austria- 
Hungary more or less to her former condition, but 
Poland wished to remain out of it. Prince Sapieha, 


then Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, thought, 
mistakenly, that such a system was displeasing to 
Paris. Not until the question of Upper Silesia became 
a burning one, and the Poles began to be anxious as to 
the application of the plebiscite in that region, did 
Prince Sapieha make advances to me, in the direc- 
tion of the Polish adhesion to the anti-Hapsburg 
convention. But these exchanges of ideas only took 
serious and concrete form when M. Skirmunt suc- 
ceeded Prince Sapieha. Skirmunt, who had formerly 
been accredited Minister to Rome, had there wit- 
nessed my line of action, and convinced himself that 
Polish interests were also involved: particularly, 
that there lay one of Poland's means of maintaining 
really intimate relations with Italy. M. Skirmunt, a 
Lithuanian-Pole full of good sense, understood also 
that it was useless to continue a kind of political 
coquetry with Hungary solely in order to annoy 
Prague, and that it was better worth while to be on 
good terms with his near neighbors. 

Changes caused by parliamentary crises pre- 
vented M. Skirmunt from carrying on his work. An 
understanding achieved by him with Czechoslovakia 
was not well received by Polish public opinion. This 
is not astonishing. The Poles gave proof of their 
strong chivalrous sentiments, inherited from the 
past, when they repelled the Bolshevik invasion in 
the summer of 1920; but political good judgment, 
independent of likings and antipathies, comes to a 
nation only after much practice in public life. And 
Poland had only just emerged from a long period of 

The Cabinets of the Successor States diverged 
from each other at various other small points. A few 


genuine enthusiasts, and a greater number of adven- 
turers who prowled round Hertenstein in Switzer- 
land, convinced the unfortunate Charles that the mo- 
ment had returned to try his fate. In spite of the 
word which he had pledged, he launched himself 
upon the new venture, even as I had predicted to the 
Federal Council. The rest belongs to history. The 
states of the Little Entente regained the most com- 
plete unity in the face of danger ; even Poland back- 
ing up the Czechoslovakian "demarches" in Buda- 
pest. The Great Powers, by their intervention, and 
Charles, through his weakness of temperament, to- 
gether rendered Czecho-Yugoslav mobilization un- 
necessary. After an interval of some hundred hours, 
at which he played at Kingship, this unhappy 
descendant of a race which had produced so many 
decisive and able characters, was shipped aboard the 
British monitor Glow-worm, and began the first 
stages of his journey to Madeira, where he died on 
April 1, 1922. 

You know what was the evil motto of his house — 
"Divide et impera. " A house guilty of the declara- 
tion of war on Serbia, that declaration which un- 
chained the European War, needs not to be accused 
of further crimes ; their conscience bears a sufficient 
burden. Yet we should not forget how the House of 
Hapsburg had always endeavored to keep alive the 
divisions of Eastern Europe, in order to further its 
own power. May we, then, hope that, now the princi- 
pal source of jealousies and divisions having dis- 
appeared, a more peaceful future is opening for 
Eastern Europe than she has ever known? 

For my part, I unhesitatingly incline to optimism, 
even to the certainty that, in a more or less remote 


future, Bulgaria may be drawn to the other Yugo- 
slav countries in a kind of Federal Union, although 
I know that the dweller amongst ancient rancors 
in Macedonia, Serbia, and Bulgaria may think my 
vision Utopian. Optimism is justifiable only if these 
States are going to be let alone ; if they are allowed to 
be themselves, and nothing else. If some among them 
should at any time allow themselves to become again 
catspaws for the secret quarrels and jealousies 
which bigger States dare not openly avow, then, ah ! 
there indeed we may tremble lest the sterile and gory 
history of the East be reopened once more. There is, 
however, ground for confidence in the knowledge 
that the old Hapsburg Austria is dead, the domineer- 
ing Austria of whom Joseph de Maistre, who had 
studied her from the two opposing observation posts 
of Petersburg and Turin, used to say that she was 
always harmful, but even more to those who trusted 
in her than to her enemies. 

It is not hate that makes me adopt the judgment 
issued a century ago by the great Savoyard political 
thinker. I know only too well that, sometimes even 
unconsciously, we in Europe are apt, out of heredi- 
tary feelings, to think in the way of hate. It is our 
curse ; it is the penalty we have to pay for so many 
centuries of history. 

Here in America you are rightly proud and thank- 
ful for your greatness, your prosperity, your im- 
mense future possibilities. There is one thing you 
ought to be even more thankful for — that you have 
no hates. It is a characteristic of yours which strikes 
me every day and adds, in my spirit, to the glorious 
peace of the country where I am now living. 

The Emperors who ruled from the Hofburg in 


Vienna fifty million men with, ten different lan- 
guages, ten opposite traditions, knew that their only 
safety lay in the constant jealousies among all these 
races : Croats against Hungarians, Hungarians 
against Austrians, Slovenes against Italians, and so 
on. It was not enough; Austrian diplomacy was al- 
ways at work for mischief between, let us say, Serbia 
and Bulgaria, between Bulgaria and Bumania. Bal- 
kan nations at peace with each other might have 
meant progress for them; they might have become 
hopeful centers of irredentist dreams for the Aus- 
trian subjects of similar nationalities. 

An artificial source of hates between fifty millions 
of Europeans has therefore disappeared with the 
disappearance of the Hapsburg monarchy, which 
was indeed nothing else than a sterile oligarchy of 
courtiers and bureaucrats, with no spiritual message 
for the world; 

Is it now much better ? Probably not. Some new in- 
justices have probably replaced some of the old ones, 
new resentments have added to old hatreds. But the 
great fact remains, where artificial and diplomatic 
Austria was standing, stand now living nations. 
Each of them had and may have again a part in Eu- 
rope's progress: Hungary, which was so long our 
valiant rampart against an aggressive Moslem East, 
Czechoslovakia, which gave with Huss a great mar- 
tyr to religious freedom; Yugoslavia, where West 
and East meet under the same language ; Rumania, 
with her peaceful and sad folklore. Each of these 
nations may commit blunders; but, like England, 
France, Germany and Italy, they are living entities ; 
they are the real permanent material out of which a 
newly organized Europe will some day emerge. 



Did I not tell you, at the beginning of these lec- 
tures, that it was difficult to find an historical period 
more full of paradoxical contradictions than the 
postwar period? I do not think, for instance, that it 
would be an exaggeration to affirm that the armi- 
stice signed in the roadstead of Mudros on October 
30, 1918, on board the warship Superb, between the 
delegates of the Sublime Porte and the British 
Admiral Calthorpe, found the two recent enemies 
in complete agreement, on at least two points : the 
feverish haste of its conclusion, and the desire to 
create, as speedily as possible, a new situation which 
would make it impossible for General Franchet 
d'Esperey, the French Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army of the East (composed of French, English, 
Italian, and Serbian forces), to march on Constanti- 
nople and there instal himself as master. The fact is 
that the Armistice of Mudros imposed upon the 
Turks neither precise nor serious conditions as to 
disarmament, disbanding of troops, nor penalties 
against, or the removal of, certain heads of the party 
"Union and Progress." 

If the haste and slackness of the Armistice of 
Mudros proves that the most pressing consideration 
there was to avert the development of a situation in 
which some other Allied force would hold the mili- 
tary preponderance, one may also draw from it the 
conclusion that, at that particular time, the end of 


the War, what afterward became so determined an 
English policy, viz. : the destruction of the Turkish 
Empire, was far from being intended. This will only 
surprise systematic minds of French or German for- 
mation, that is to say, reasoning and logical minds 
which never can take into account that the rapid 
changes which, on our continent, are so often at- 
tributed to the perfidy of Albion are in reality due to 
no other cause than to the rough-and-ready empiri- 
cism and improvisation which are part of the British 
political make-up. 

Some days after the armistice, England, France, 
and Italy decided to entrust the guarding of their in- 
terests in Turkey to three High Commissioners. The 
Englishman was Admiral Calthorpe (a signatory of 
the Armistice of Mudros), the French, Admiral 
Amet (who commanded the French squadron in the 
Levant), the Italian, myself. 

In reality, at that moment of the apparent destruc- 
tion of all Turkish authority, and pending the nego- 
tiations of the Big Four in Paris, our task was 
rather that of governors. We had at our orders the 
squadrons in the Bosphorus and the military con- 
tingents on shore. We organized an administration, 
a guardianship of order, and the revival of the 
Allies' banking, educational, religious, and other in- 
stitutions which had been destroyed or closed during 
the years of war. The three High Commissioners 
held their meetings once a week in their respective 
embassies by turns, each time under the presidency 
of the master of the house. The Serbian, Greek, Ru- 
manian, and other representatives, following each 
other to Constantinople, presented themselves be- 
fore us as before a Supreme Local Council and our 



administration was carried on without too much na- 
tional rivalry; our harmony and loyalty were con- 
stant. At first my two colleagues were inclined to 
think that I was too lenient in my dealings with the 
Turks ; that I showed, perhaps, a little too much re- 
gard for the conquered Sultan; that, personally, I 
was too cordial toward the former grand viziers and 
other personages of the Empire, who little by little 
came out of their hiding places ; that I did not suffi- 
ciently ignore the Sublime Porte. I am sure that dur- 
ing the first weeks of that winter (1918-1919) the 
two admirals, in the bottom of their hearts, must 
have put down this weakness of mine to my unfortu- 
nate quality of civilian. But they were men full of 
good sense. Little by little they felt that I was guided 
by very serious reaons: the conviction that Turkey 
was far from dead, that she was only temporarily 
down and that, if we pulled the rope too tight, she 
would escape from our hands ; we might remain mas- 
ters of Constantinople, but we should be masters of 
a wonderful empty house ; the active forces of Tur- 
key would retire deeper into Asia, out of our reach, 
and that, once there, they would turn against us. 

This situation and these anticipations I had, from 
the very first, communicated to my Government. I 
informed it that I could only serve my country by 
acting on these ideas, and that I would interpret its 
silence as implying approval of my line of policy. I 
could not expect much more than silent approval, for 
my conception of the potential situation of the Turk- 
ish people excluded those projects of Asiatic parti- 
tion that were being entertained in Paris, in which it 
was sought to interest the Italian Government. 

The Sultan, weak and uncertain, violent in little 


things and cowardly in serious, was the typical de- 
scendant and head of a dynasty that is condemned 
and whose role is ended. He had chosen as grand 
vizier, Ferid Damad Pasha, who, as the title 
"Damad" indicates had married one of the Sultan's 
sisters, Princess Alide. Ferid had studied at Oxford ; 
he was, to all outward appearance, a very successful 
copy of an English gentleman. In reality, nothing 
and no one in official Turkey showed the slightest 
sign of life or strength. Those who, in London, tried 
to persuade Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon that 
they could, in the future, do anything they liked in 
Turkey had reason to believe they were right. 

Now and again I saw, and did not conceal the fact, 
the few men who afterward made up the ruling class 
at Angora, among them, Mustafa Kemal who, as the 
hero of the defense of the Dardanelles, was already 
popular amongst the Turks. I felt that these men 
were speaking the truth when they declared their 
ability to maintain their independence in Asia, 
whither they were already inclined to withdraw. 
When, therefore, on May 12, 1919, Admiral Cal- 
thorpe invited his French and Italian colleagues to 
the English embassy to communicate to them in- 
structions from the Conference of Paris with regard 
to the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, I, for my 
part., was convinced that the affairs of the Entente 
would take a very bad turn in Turkey. But our 
instructions were categorical and nothing could be 
done. The landing was what it was bound to be, what, 
at the meeting of the High Commissioners, I had 
expressed the fear that it would be, a fightless yet 
bloody operation, whence issued, wounded to death, 
the party whose violence could appear to have been 


successful only to those who could not see through 
appearances. Greece was doomed from the day she 
planted her flag in Smyrna. 

On the landing of the Greeks, the Turkish troops 
had at once withdrawn into their barracks. They 
acted so by the orders of the grand vizier who, not 
from treachery but from weakness and well-mean- 
ing, had sent emissaries to Smyrna advising resigna- 
tion and giving assurances that the Greek occupa- 
tion would be only temporary. Moreover, there were 
not then in Smyrna any of those fedais (the sacri- 
ficed) who became, at a later date, fanatics to the 
death in the Turkish national cause. 

Who, then, fired from the barracks the first shot 
which let loose the massacre! My informers assured 
me at the time that it was a Greek agent provocateur. 
It is probable ; not, certainly in consequence of poli- 
tical instructions from Athens, but owing to the folly 
of some Greek commander who wanted to fight an 
easy " battle" and win a still more easy "victory." 
However it may be, if up to then there had been 
hopes of rinding a solution equally acceptable to 
everyone, after the Smyrna landing it was too late. 
Mistakes in politics, as in moral life, beget mistakes. 

The Sublime Porte had previously been guilty of 
the imprudence of sending Mustafa Kemal away 
from Constantinople by giving him a command in 
Asia. He was near Samsun when the news of the oc- 
cupation of Smyrna reached him. He summoned the 
people together and made them a speech which 
moved them to tears. An English officer, who was in 
the district, dispatched a telegram to Constantinople 
demanding the immediate recall of the young gen- 
eral. The Sublime Porte was invited to issue such an 


order; with the forms that it had inherited from 
Byzantium, Mustafa was cautiously invited to come 
to Stamboul only to discuss the general situation. 

He displayed a trait still more Byzantine when 
friends, or prospective friends, from the Porte it- 
self, warned him urgently that the summons was go- 
ing to be dispatched. He who had not yet decided to 
break with the capital, it may be from a patriotic 
sentiment, set out on a tour of inspection toward 
Erzerum and thus avoided the necessity of ignoring 
an order from the Sultan, an order that, so to speak, 
never reached him. 

I am telling you these facts, which have probably 
never before been made public, because you will 
draw from them this conclusion : that with a certain 
amount of moral courage the situation might still 
have been saved. 

Why was it not? Partly, I am afraid, because I 
was the only High Commissioner who told his capi- 
tal and Paris that it was not only desirable, but im- 
perative, to conclude a peace with Turkey satisfac- 
tory to all sides ; that Turkish satisfaction would be 
the best guarantee of advantages that we should 
have acquired all the same ; that if we asked for too 
much we would run the risk of a complete loss of our 
position. If my colleagues at Constantinople did not 
express themselves with equal decision, it was not 
because they were far from sharing my convictions, 
but only that, being members of fighting services, 
they were, as such, imbued with the psychosis of war 
and hesitated to state clearly what they could not 
fail to perceive in the depths of their consciences. 

It was in Paris at the Peace Conference that 
everything conspired to confuse men's minds. The 


French, engrossed as they were by their situation on 
the Rhine, were not inclined to oppose too plainly 
the English on a part of the chessboard less vital to 
themselves. It was the same with the Italians, pre- 
occupied exclusively in their turn, with the Adriatic 
question. The English — the English were Mr. Lloyd 
George and Lord Curzon. 

Nobody has been more struck than I by the late 
Prime Minister's rare qualities of intuition and 
rapidity of action. During the War in his quarrels 
with the generals he was always right, as when he 
wished to break the enemy mass by driving into Aus- 
tria with a gigantic Anglo-Italian effort, whilst some 
of the British field marshals had no other tactics 
than this : in attack, to find out the enemy in his 
strongest position and hurl themselves upon him ; in 
defense, to stop and resist heroically and die. 

But West is West and East is East. And Mr. 
Lloyd George, in the West, had learned to know by 
himself. Moreover, he, a ' ' frock, ' ' as Sir Henry Wil- 
son mockingly called the civilians, was suspicious of 
the general views of the "brass-hats." In the East 
what he believed to be the military truth was put 
before him by another "frock," Mr. Venizelos. Mr. 
Venizelos is also a very remarkable man, and had 
powerful excuses for having miscalculated the forces 
at work in the East. He dreamed a great dream, the 
"megala idea" which had consoled so many genera- 
tions of Greeks during centuries of slavery and mis- 
ery. He hoped to realize it with the help of England, 
who seemed to him all-powerful. 

The fatal error was committed, and, since no one 
wished to acknowledge it, the situation throughout 
all Turkey, beginning at Constantinople, grew 


worse. An English Intelligence Service, composed of 
specialist officers, took over all the political and 
police control. The blunders which these specialists 
committed contributed not a little to shake Occiden- 
tal prestige. Allow me by way of example to reca- 
pitulate to you one of the finest feats of what was 
designated the Inter-Allied Police, but which, in 
fact, was British. 

One morning it was reported that a great con- 
spiracy was about to destroy the Allies. The Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Allied Army of Occupation 
was warned that a vast conspiracy had been formed 
to raise a revolution in Constantinople to assassinate 
himself and several other officers. He furnished the 
Turkish authorities with a list of the supposed guilty 
parties, whose arrest he demanded within one week, 
failing which he would be compelled to take vigor- 
ous measures against the population. The list pre- 
sented by General Harrington to the Ottoman Minis- 
ter of War contained twenty-eight names, of which 
eleven belonged to Turkish politicians then residing 
in Angora, whilst the other seventeen were insuffi- 
ciently described and completely unknown persons. 
Only by their first names and by their places of ori- 
gin did the English police describe the authors of the 
redoubtable conspiracy. There was no question of 
arresting the parties in Angora; but how discover, 
in Constantinople, Ali of Yalova or Mehmed of 

The Turks were not at a loss in so small a matter. 
They congratulated General Harrington on having 
fortunately escaped so great a danger, and them- 
selves on their capital having been saved from so 
frightful a crime, promising to do all in their power 


to secure the arrest of those guilty ones. The few 
names of politicians inscribed on the famous list 
threw sufficient light on its origin. The commander 
of the Allied forces had, of course, acted in absolute 
good faith, but the Orientals who had invented and 
denounced the plot simply wanted to get the men 
then in office into difficulties in order to step into 
their places. Nevertheless, rather than cast a doubt 
on the reality of the plot, or even on the existence of 
the accused, the Ottoman authorities said to them- 
selves that there were in Constantinople a dozen Alis 
and Mehmeds who were not worth the rope to hang 
them. Eight were found at once, and hanged. Gen- 
eral Harrington rendered public tribute to the loy- 
alty of the Turkish Government, and withdrew his 
threats. This was merely comic, except for the 
hanged ones, but what followed was both tragic and 

On March 16, 1920, General Milne, commanding 
the English forces, occupied all the important posi- 
tions in the capital, the Ministry of War, the tele- 
graph- and post-offices, and ordered the arrest of 
several dozen senators and deputies. A state of siege 
was proclaimed. A few days later, the Sheik-ul-Islam 
issued the fetva proclaiming the Nationalists at 
Angora to be rebels and excluding them from the 
Moslem community. 

The reply was not long delayed. On April 23, 
1920, the National Assembly in Angora inaugurated 
its labors with solemn prayer, and elected a Grand 
Council to which it entrusted the carrying out of its 
decisions. Mustafa Kemal was the soul and real 
head of this Council. A few days later the Grand 
Council transformed itself into a Provisional Cabi- 


net, the word "Provisional" being employed merely 
to show that the Nationalists had no intention of giv- 
ing up Constantinople. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs was Bekir Sami Bey, a Mussulman of the 
Caucasus, who, the year following, represented the 
Government of Angora at the Supreme Council in 
London. The politics of Angora became decisively 
xenophobic, embracing in its hatred both English and 
French. It was the consequence of the facts already 
known at Angora which were later to result in the 
stillborn Treaty of Sevres of which you know the 
sense. The Italians alone were not ill treated, the ef- 
fect of the attitude of good will that I had adopted 
from the beginning. 

You are acquainted with the sequence of events. 
Mustafa first of all raised armed bands, and behind 
them organized a solid army. The stronger he grew 
the more the Turks turned to him. The very officials 
of the Sublime Porte longed in their hearts for his 
triumph. To the Turks the end was henceforth plain. 
It was only a question of time. One point only re- 
mained uncertain, variable. This was the decision of 
the Allies, who in April, 1920, at San Renio had 
ended by accepting the hard English terms of peace. 

On the eve of San Remo, in March, Lord Curzon 
said, "The effective strength of Kemal has been 
overestimated, he is not as important a factor as 
some assert," and, by this general phrase "some" 
he referred to the man who has now the honor of 
speaking to you. 

Moreover, in June, after San Remo, Mr. Lloyd 
George declared in a great speech that Greece only 
was capable of "taking the place" of the Ottoman 
Government. At Hythe, toward the end of June, Mr. 


Lloyd George had a meeting with the French Pre- 
mier Millerand. Mr. Venizelos offered England, 
whose military situation in Turkey had finished by 
becoming dangerous, the complete collaboration of 
all the Greek forces. The plan drawn up by Mr. 
Venizelos provided for the swift march toward the 
interior of Anatolia, of a well-equipped army of 90,- 
000 Greeks, who would cut all KemaPs lateral com- 
munications and force him to retire into the interior 
where his forces would be dissolved. The French 
prime minister was resigned rather than disposed to 
accept the project, being pushed thereto by general 
diplomatic considerations and by the preoccupations 
which the Turks were causing him on the Cilician- 
Syrian frontier. But the consent of Italy was neces- 
sary ; and for the purpose of obtaining it a meeting 
of the Supreme Council was held at Boulogne-sur- 
Mer immediately afterward. I had just taken the di- 
rection of the Italian foreign policy, and went there 
to represent Italy. 

Apropos of the projected Hellenic invasion of 
Anatolia, I declared formally that it would be a very 
grave mistake, and that if it were desired to redouble 
the life and strength of Turkish militarism and na- 
tionalism, that would certainly be the best line to 
take to ensure it. 

A month afterward, we met again for the confer- 
ence at Spa (July, 1920). Mr. Venizelos presented 
himself there, for the last time, to urge his proposal 
before the Supreme Council, and to have his way. 
The Council was composed of Lloyd George, Miller- 
and, and myself. 

Venizelos set forth his reasons for being certain 
of success. I was the only one who replied, opposing 


his argument by showing the danger that Greece 
would run, and I finished my reply with these very 
words : ' ' My only regret is that the attitude of Italy 
should be attributed to want of sympathy or even 
distrust toward Greece. I feel myself, on the con- 
trary, inspired by sentiments of deep concern for 
her true interests. No peace is good that is not a 
peace tolerable to both sides. The Greeks in gaining 
too much risk losing everything. I am quite sure that 
in this hall there is at least one person who feels the 
deep sincerity of my words, and that person is Mr. 

When I had finished speaking I felt that rare 
pleasure that one never experiences from the ap- 
plause of crowds and parliaments. I looked at Mr. 
Venizelos and saw from the expression of his face, 
always so open and of such quick intelligence, that 
he had appreciated the deep sincerity of my words, 
and that, if only for a moment, the impression had 
come upon him that some day they might prove too 
true. But the die was cast already, and you all know 
in what a tragic fashion it ended for Greece two 
years later. 

The conference which met in London in February, 
1921, should have opened the eyes of the most confi- 
dent. What did we see there? The delegation of im- 
perial Turkey, of the Sublime Porte, was headed by 
a venerable man respected by all, Tewfik Pasha, who 
had been grand vizier many times. The delegation 
from Angora was also there, headed by their Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs, Bekir Sami Bey. The British 
Government refused to receive the latter by itself, 
for fear of thus according Angora a sort of official 
recognition. To the astounded eyes of the Occiden- 


tals there appeared one morning, in perfect har- 
mony, and sitting on the same bench, the two delega- 
tions who were supposed to hate each other, as those 
engaged in civil strife know how to hate. In our eyes, 
in English eyes, the venerable Tewfik Pasha was the 
head of all these Turks, but he asserted his position 
of chief solely in order to yield the word to Bekir 
Sami Bey, who was the only spokesman on the side 
of the Turks, of either Stamboul or Angora. 

I then tried to use my influence over Bekir to make 
him adopt a moderate attitude. I was fortunate 
enough to succeed. He showed himself more willing 
than the Greeks to place himself in the hands of an 
impartial arbitrator. An arbitration was decided 
upon. It was to take place after an enquiry. Now this 
was already a point gained, and this was why I first 
started the idea, feeling sure that Mr. Lloyd George 
would end by adopting it, since he had, with ample 
reason, less sympathy with the new Greek premier, 
Mr. Calogeropulos, than with his predecessor, and 
was beginning to feel less confidence in the future of 

When Great Britain, France, and Italy proposed 
an enquiry, it was in effect to acknowledge that the 
authors of the Treaty of Sevres had been ill in- 
formed, and that it was necessary to begin again 
from the beginning. This deprived Angora of all rea- 
son for intransigence and opened a future way for 
all possibilities. 

Thanks to the intelligent understanding of Bekir, 
I also cleared the way of the tripartite agreement 
which pledged France, Great Britain, and Italy to 
guarantee the latter a special sphere of economic in- 


fluence in Anatolia. Bekir signed with me a new 
treaty, spontaneously recognizing, under certain 
clauses, a series of Italian privileges in the same 
zone. 1 An act of free will was thus substituted for a 
convention imposed upon the Turks from outside 
without consulting them. 

So it seemed still possible to secure soon a tolerable 
peace. But it was nothing of the kind. Three months 
later the Oriental situation again grew worse. The 
Greeks had rejected the Commission of Enquiry, and 
decided to resort to arms. 

You know all about this unhappy adventure. The 
Greeks, beaten at first, succeeded in the summer of 
1921 in occupying Afium-Karahissar and Kutaja. 
The front held firm for one year, but in August, 1922, 
the reconstituted Turkish army destroyed the Greek 
front and occupied Smyrna. King Constantine lost 
his throne. Great Britain, France, and Italy inter- 
posed between Turks and Greeks. The result of four 
years of blunders, illusions, and excessive preten- 
sions was the Armistice of Mudania on October 11, 
1922, by which Europe was obliged to consent to 
the reentry into Constantinople of the Nationalists 
and to that of the Turkish Government into Eastern 
Thrace; in short, the complete return of the Turk 
into Europe. The Treaty of Lausanne only served to 
accentuate the end of all European privilege. 

Chance willed that I should take part in the nego- 
tiations that preceded the Armistice of Mudania. I 
was no longer Minister of Foreign Affairs, but Am- 
bassador in Paris, and as the negotiations took place 
in Paris, whither Lord Curzon had come, it was we 

1 See Document IV, p. 104. 


three, Curzon, Poincare, and myself, who had to deal 
with the question. 

I shall never forget the sad confession that Lord 
Curzon, with tears in his eyes, made to me one after- 
noon in a room on the Quai d'Orsay. Proud as he 
was, he owned, to his credit, honestly, that he had 
made a mistake, and that it was the man he was 
addressing who, for all his apparent anti-nationalis- 
tic slackness, had best tried to guard the interests of 
the West. Such regrets, however, are useless in poli- 
tics, altogether meritorious though they may be in 
moral psychology. 

What then was wrong during the post- Versailles 
period, with the Oriental policy of England, at other 
times and on other occasions so generous and far- 
sighted? If we endeavor to answer this question, we 
shall at the same time draw from these souvenirs a 
lasting moral. For governments of great empires it 
is more necessary than for small countries to judge 
apparent successes and apparent checks with the 
sobering background of history. As life is continu- 
ous and men have memories and expectations, the 
leaders who think of an immediate success are rarely 
doing service to that august continuity which is the 
history of a great country. It was perhaps possible 
to destroy the Turks; although the attempt did not 
succeed. It was impossible to believe that, by so 
doing, a mortal blow would be dealt to the Moslem 
World, and to its cohesion and spirit of resistance. 
This spirit of resistance is merely the Mussulman 
defensive : a defensive provoked by fear. The essen- 
tial thing is to remove this fear. 

Can it still be done? Yes ! it can, because the East 
still wants the West more than we think. I say it for 


the Near East as well as for the Far East. But the 
problem of establishing, let us say of reestablishing, 
European influence in the East cannot be — will never 
be — a simple problem of force. 



Of late years it has been the fashion to lament that 
the treaties of 1919 "balkanized" Europe, that is, 
that they served to cut it up into far too many small 
states whose very existence harbors and multiplies 
the seeds of war. From hearing these criticisms, one 
might be led to ask oneself whether the Great War 
had really been provoked by, say Denmark or Switz- 
erland, or rather by the preconceived intention of 
one of the greatest European states, Austria-Hun- 
gary. No ; the lesser nations, so long as each of them 
forms a real and well-defined national entity, will be 
among the truest sureties for peace in the Europe of 
tomorrow. And this, not only because small nations 
have a deeper concern for peace than is ever the case 
with the greater ones (since, in war, they have all 
to lose by being invariably trampled upon by the 
giants), but also because the salvation and the future 
unity of Europe are nearer the hearts of the small 
than of the great peoples. It is the little states which 
cling to the League of Nations with, at times, an 
almost embarrassing affection. Moreover, even a les- 
ser nationality, if it has succeeded in keeping its life 
and literature intact, is one of the flames of human 
thought. By what right, therefore, should one wish 
that flame extinguished? Finland, which has fought 
for her existence under the Russian Terror, has a 
finer message for humanity than, let us say, the old 
bureaucratic Austria-Hungary, which was formed 


by the compression of ten nationalities, with not one 
single idea of her own. 

So, I do not think it will be a waste of your time if 
I examine with you the efforts toward international 
life made by the Baltic States since their independ- 

You are all too familiar with European political 
problems for me to squander your time in generali- 
ties. You know that, in the course of the nineteenth 
century, which was the era of new-found nationali- 
ties, a swift awakening befell even the little Baltic 
nations, each differing so profoundly in race and 
language from its powerful German and Russian 
neighbors. Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, only awaited 
the right moment for asserting their own life; the 
moment came, with the Great War. 

At the beginning of 1920 I was struck with the 
strong and frank tone of an Esthonian diplomatic 
document which came under my notice at the Ital- 
ian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The document reads 
as follows : "It is said in Europe that, if Russia had 
not crumbled, the Baltic States could never have 
been born, and that if Russia were to resume her 
place in the concert of the Powers, the fate of some 
of us would be at stake. We venture to think that we 
owe our own independence not solely to the fall of 
Russia. That empire seemed a mighty one; but it 
contained the germ of disruption in its violent policy 
toward the allogeneous nationalities. Events has- 
tened the hour of our deliverance ; but in any case it 
would have struck, some day. A living nation cannot 
be killed; justice cannot with impunity be tampered 
with." This optimistic language was no bluff, for a 
simple reason : because it was sincere. Similar speech 



and feeling were to be met at Riga, the capital of 
Latvia, and at Helsingfors, the capital of Finland. 
Subsequent events showed that these small States 
had the will to live, and were alive. It is therefore 
well that we should study them. History is not merely 
a natural phenomenon, as some sociologists would 
have it, but a moral phenomenon also. 

The history of great territories may be paltry, 
once the hour of decadence has struck for a country. 
Inversely, there are periods when the history of 
small States may hold significance and interest. In- 
deed, it is because the Baltic States constitute a kind 
of microcosm, by their compactness facilitating ob- 
servation, that I will ask you to study, with what may 
seem a tedious amount of detail, their recent history 
and their efforts for union. We shall thus prove that 
the idea of a Baltic Union, which already existed 
before the Baltic people won their independence, has 
not ceased since then to direct the international 
policy of those States. Such a union seemed inevi- 
table, even apart from the interests of the new-born 
States, as being a continuation or a resumption of a 
European political tradition. That is the standing 
necessity to prevent the Baltic from becoming a 
mare clausum dominated by the strongest occupant 
of its shores. Fortunately, moreover, the call to 
union rang out more clearly among the Baltic States, 
then in the act of formation, because it was impera- 
tive to face a common danger, and simultaneously to 
acquire a part in European politics which corre- 
sponded to their vitality. 

In the spring of 1917, the events in Russia had 
aroused great expectations in Latvia and Estho- 
nia, as amongst all races oppressed by Czardom. 


They hoped for a large share of autonomy in the 
loosened administration of the Russian State. But 
the realization was soon forced upon them that the 
provisional Russian Government lent itself unwill- 
ingly to such a lessening of central authority. More- 
over, the Russian Liberals were undecided ideolo- 
gists. After them, Kerenski was — Kerenski. So, when 
in November, 1917, the Bolsheviki seized hold of 
power, and when disbanded Russian troops joined 
themselves to Bolshevik forces in order to pillage the 
country, the Latvians, who in spite of schemings 
and promises made by nobles of Germanic origin, 
had maintained their moral independence, resolved, 
together with the Esthonians further north, to break 
all ties which still held them to Russia, and to de- 
clare their entire independence. This proclamation 
was made in Esthonia on September 24, 1918 ; in Lat- 
via, where greater hindrances were caused by the 
intrigues of German feudalists, who owned a large 
part of the Latvian soil, a similar declaration came 
only on November 18. 

The successful occupation of Esthonia by German 
troops deferred the organizing of national independ- 
ence. Those Esthonian politicians who were able to 
escape the authorities in occupation, and to avoid 
imprisonment, managed to go abroad and set to 
work to acquaint the Allies and neutrals with the 
aspirations of their people. These first efforts at 
Esthonian and Latvian independence were, with 
few variants, those of other countries which broke 
away from Russia. All patriots from Finland, Estho- 
nia, Latvia, and Lithuania, who were refugees in 
Stockholm, London, and Paris, met and conferred 
among themselves, exchanged the longings, vows, 



dreams of their races, and united their efforts to 
ensure for them a successful realization. It was 
amongst these men, without diplomatic experience, 
but with a great love for their countries downtrod- 
den by the invader, that the Baltic entente first took 
shape. Each of them thought not merely of obtaining 
selfish advantages for his country, but rising to a 
loftier understanding of their collective interests, 
acted with the view of securing for all alike the same 
rights and guarantees. 

At these meetings of the Baltic delegates held in 
London and Paris in 1918 and 1919, were discussed 
nothing less than the general status of northeastern 
Europe and the international status of the Baltic. A 
Swedish statesman, Branting, who later on won such 
deserved esteem at Geneva, did not hesitate to join 
them. The formation of a vast Baltic Union was even 
considered, the idea of which was not abandoned by 
some before the middle of 1920. One finds, indeed, a 
last vestige of it in the provisional program for the 
Conference of Bulduri, near Riga, of August, 1920, 
in which Poland, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania took part, a program that contemplated, 
also, the participation of the Scandinavian States, 
Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. 

The provisional rules of the conference contained, 
in fact, in their first article the following: "The 
countries that will take part in the Conference of 
Baltic States as members enjoying equal rights are : 
Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. 
The Scandinavian States Sweden, Norway, and Den- 
mark may be added to the above-mentioned countries 
if they express the wish to take part in the Confer- 
ence. " 


This was not expressed and the great Baltic 
Union, for some time contemplated, still rests in the 
domain of future possibilities. When Esthonia, after 
a struggle of over a year waged simultaneously on 
two fronts, found it advisable to discuss Soviet pro- 
posals of peace, she wished to lay the foundations of 
a general peace between Russia and all her Baltic 
neighbors. She could not, even at the risk of losing 
precious supports, fail to take the only road that 
assured her safety. Waging a purely defensive war 
it was impossible, the country being freed and the 
enemy driven over the frontier, to repel the offer 
made to her. The Esthonian Government was, more- 
over, bound to avoid any appearance of getting im- 
plicated in any intervention in the internal affairs of 
Eussia, for this would not have been understood or 
approved by the people, sorely tried and exhausted 
as they were by successive occupations of the coun- 
try and their hard campaigns of liberation. Still the 
Esthonian Government was none the less anxious to 
remain closely united to its allies. Therefore, the 
first condition that it made with the Bolsheviki, 
before engaging in negotiations, was the suspension 
of hostilities with Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
Moreover, at the very moment of carrying on the 
Esthono-Russian peace negotiations, Esthonia was 
represented at the Baltic Conference at Helsingfors 
in January, 1920, and joined Finland, Latvia, and 
Poland in deciding to conclude a military defensive 

If Esthonia was the first to sign a peace with 
Russia, Latvia was not long in following suit and 
signed the Russian peace at Riga on August 11, 1920. 
Finland signed hers, at Tartu, on October 14 of the 



same year. By these treaties Soviet Russia unre- 
servedly recognized the independence and absolute 
sovereignty of the three States and renounced all 
rights that had been exercised by the old imperial 

It was a basis of life, but very feeble ; and the three 
States realized that it was necessary for their exist- 
ence to effect the Baltic Union. This Union was to be 
the outcome of the Bulduri Conference, which I 
have already mentioned in connection with the 
primitive dream of a B alto-Scandinavian Union. To 
tell the truth, circumstances were most favorable for 
the success of this design. As nothing helps to unite 
two peoples so much as a common fear or a common 
hatred, — hatreds, alas, in foreign politics binding 
much more closely than affinities — circumstances 
could not do otherwise than increase the reasons in 
favor of union. It was, in fact, the period of the great 
Red push on Warsaw. The defeat of Poland would 
rightly have seemed to be the prologue to the loss of 
her smaller neighbors. On the other hand, the Secre- 
tary of State of the United States had just issued his 
famous note on the indivisibility of Russia, and his 
consequent refusal to recognize the States arising 
from its dismemberment, with the exception of Po- 
land and Finland. Finland, Poland, Esthonia, Lat- 
via, and Lithuania, taking part in this conference, 
found themselves, therefore, naturally disposed to 
find in union a strength and a guarantee of existence 
which was not to be found elsewhere. 

The program of the conference included the con- 
clusion of a military defensive convention, the 
examination of very many economic and financial 
questions, such as commercial exchanges, patent 


rights, permanent exhibitions, the creation of a 
Superior Economic Council, a common banking 
policy, the unification of railway systems, etc. The 
labors of the conference lasted five weeks during 
which success was attained in establishing an eco- 
nomic convention, and a convention relative to extra- 
dition and to mutual assistance in judicial matters. 

Moreover, a convention creating a permanent 
Court of Arbitration, to which the contracting States 
engaged themselves to submit all differences arising 
between them, was signed by a majority of the par- 
ticipating States. Certain dispositions of it were 
singularly categorical, such as, for example, those of 
Article 6, which ran as follows : ' ' The fact of having 
recourse to the Court of Arbitration entails the obli- 
gation of submitting conscientiously to its decisions. 
In the event of one of the parties refusing to con- 
form to this engagement, all the other Contracting 
Parties pledge themselves to insist upon the carry- 
ing out of the Decree, and to compel by every means 
within their power the submission of the recalcitrant 
party. ' ' 

But the essential part of the program of the con- 
ference, the conclusion of a military defensive alli- 
ance, and, in fact, the realization of the Baltic Union, 
remained unexecuted, by reason of the Vilna dispute 
between Poland and Lithuania. The conference sepa- 
rated in the hope that a speedy settlement of the dis- 
pute would render it possible soon to finish the work 

On the morrow of the Bulduri meeting, the Baltic 
delegations proceeded to Geneva to formulate their 
request for admission into the League of Nations. 
The demand of Finland was granted forthwith. The 



demands of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were 
not acceded to for the reason that their recognition 
de jure had not been accorded by the Great Allied 
Powers. This was a heavy blow for Latvia and for 
Esthonia ; but in two months time, on January 21, 
1921, one of the Supreme Councils, which at that 
time met periodically, came together in Paris. The 
Baltic delegates returned to Paris, to plead their 
cause once more. 

For my part, being then a member of the Supreme 
Council, I was agreeably impressed by the air of 
serious competency, modest but assured, of men 
such as Mejeroviz, the Latvian delegate, or Pusta, 
the Esthonian, the latter of whom was later on to 
develop a course of action, so meritorious and so well 
carried out, in the cause of the Baltic League. 

When the question of recognizing these States 
came before the Council, an incident occurred which 
is curious enough to be mentioned here. M. Briand, 
who presided at the meeting, having begun by asking 
his colleagues' opinion, Lord Curzon demanded to be 
heard. With his solemn Victorian eloquence, which 
on no occasion he forgot to use, he enlarged for half 
an hour upon the inconvenience and unwisdom of 
committing ourselves definitely with regard to the 
Baltic States ; if ever the formula of another British 
statesman, "wait and see," was to be used, this was 
really the case. One could not foresee what the future 
might bring in that direction ; and, while expressing 
the best of good will toward the Baltic States, he felt 
it best to remain, as it were, agnostic with regard to 

I nest demanded a hearing, declaring that I could 
not follow the reasoning of my British colleague. It 


was not possible to be more Russian than the Rus- 
sian Government itself ; and, since that Government 
had recognized Latvia, Esthonia, and Georgia, and 
since we were concerned with races differing totally 
from the Russian people in language and mental out- 
look, it seemed to me unjust and impolitic not to ac- 
cord to them such support and strengthening as the 
recognition de jure would afford. The Baltic peoples 
had already proved themselves worthy of their inde- 
pendence at a grave crisis. It was right that the 
Great Powers should show confidence in them. 

Next I developed those political reasons counsel- 
ling, in the interest of Georgia, that the recognition 
of that country should be deferred. M. Briand 
agreed with me. Lord Curzon, only partially shaken, 
was about to rise and reply to me, when Mr. Lloyd 
George arose and said: "I have listened to the oppo- 
site views of Lord Curzon and of Count Sforza. I 
must admit that I share our Italian colleague's point 
of view." The embarrassment of Lord Curzon, so 
sensitive in his amour propre, is present with me 
still. I tried to salve his hurt by saying that such 
divisions of opinion on the merit of a question, even 
between statesmen belonging to the same country, 
were the most hopeful signs of progress toward the 
organic unity of Europe. I am afraid I grossly exag- 
gerated; but, in the Chinese phrase, Lord Curzon 's 
face was saved. 

Two years after the attempt of Bulduri, the Bal- 
tic States held another meeting, this time at Warsaw. 
It occurred in March, 1922, on the eve of the Genoa 
Conference. The Polish-Baltic Conference had for 
president Skirmunt, then Polish Minister for For- 



eign Affairs — a solid Lithuanian full of common 

Work was carried on with a cordiality expressive 
of a wish for understanding. A convention was, in- 
deed, established whereby Poland, Latvia, Estho- 
nia, and Finland undertook: (1) to acquaint each 
other with all treaties which any of the parties in- 
volved might conclude with another State; (2) to 
maintain a benevolent reciprocal neutrality and to 
give concerted help to any of the parties attacked, 
without provocation, by a fifth State. 

The Finnish Government did not, however, decide 
to bring this treaty before its parliament. The con- 
vention, therefore, remained unratified; but its 
moral importance was none the less great. Moreover, 
their community of race and language with the 
Esthonians, and the proofs of cohesion given by the 
two neighboring republics, are constantly increasing 
in Finland the movement of complete solidarity. 

The failure of the Geneva Protocol, a scheme so 
popular among the lesser states, reinduced the Baltic 
republics to consider the conclusion of a union among 
themselves. The lacunae of the Covenant, so clearly 
exposed at Geneva, the fact that a door remained 
opened to war after the rejection of the Protocol, 
urged the Baltic States afresh to ensure for each 
other reciprocal supplementary guarantees. A gen- 
eral Convention of Arbitration and of Conciliation 
was signed, at the conference of Polish, Finnish, 
Esthonian, and Latvian Ministers for Foreign Af- 
fairs, met together at Helsingfors on January 17, 
1925. 1 This time, the convention was ratified by all 
signatories, and is actually in working order. 

1 See Document VI, p. 108. 


In August, 1925, a fresh conference was prepared 
at Reval. M. Pusta, then the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs for Esthonia, had drawn up a scheme of pro- 
tocol accentuating, in a happy formula, the intimacy 
existing between the parties in question, and fixing 
semiannual meetings between the Ministers for For- 
eign Affairs of all four countries. 2 Participation in 
these plans was already ensured when the meeting 
had to be postponed on account of the sudden death 
of M. Mejeroviz. Further meetings, however, con- 
firmed the close union between Finland, Esthonia, 
and Latvia, with a common contact with Poland on 
all questions relating to the maintenance of peace. 
It may even be said that general feeling becomes 
more and more united on that subject, since M. 
Erich, one of the most important politicians of Fin- 
land, the country which had hitherto been the most 
reluctant to commit itself by the written word, has 
lately launched the idea of a northern Locarno. 

It would be judging the situation too narrowly to 
object that, after so many attempts, the only written 
bond between the Baltic States — Lithuania being 
excepted on account of the Vilna question — is the 
General Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation 
signed at Helsingfors in January, 1925. Written 
texts go but a little way toward establishing a moral 
atmosphere. In fact, virtually, psychologically, the 
Baltic Union already exists. The truth of this will 
henceforth prove itself whenever these States are 
confronted by a problem which concerns their status. 
The fact of their identical interests, or, if you will, 
fears, will constantly impel them to a concerted and 
frequently unified course of action. This has already 

2 See Document VII, p. 116. 



been demonstrated at every meeting of the League 
of Nations, where their views have never yet been 
divergent. The most recent proof of this is the man- 
ner in which each one is now carrying on pourparlers 
with Russia to conclude a pact of security. Not being 
able to establish with the Soviet Government, the col- 
lective premise for a northern Locarno, as Moscow 
has been willing to begin only isolated conversations 
with each State, Finland, Latvia, and Esthonia 
have thought it necessary to submit to the Russian 
will and have agreed to hold isolated pourparlers 
with their powerful neighbor ; but, at the same time 
they have decided to keep each other constantly ac- 
quainted with the progress of the conversations in 
order to maintain an identical attitude. Russia, 
scorning in words, but adopting in reality the tricks 
of the old diplomacy, wanted to play one state 
against the other. Their loyal decision renders vain 
the Soviet Machiavellianism. The visit of the Minis- 
ters of Foreign Affairs of Finland and Latvia, last 
winter, to their Esthonian colleague, was intended to 
mark the close solidarity with which all these states 
intend to work together toward Russia. The decision 
to renew constantly such meetings will end by giving 
the impression of the periodical assembly of a super- 

The very fact that no solemn, completed formula 
of a Baltic Union has yet been possible of achieve- 
ment increases, to my mind, the feeling of a real 
unity. Reciprocal difficulties are not being ignored; 
the consciousness that much still remains to be done 
renders the effort toward completion greater. Every 
time that divergent interests make themselves felt, 
work proceeds gradually, by indirect stages, smooth- 


ing down by bilateral treaties such obstacles as 
might delay progress toward the goal. A whole net- 
work of commercial treaties has been formed be- 
tween the Baltic States. Latvia and Esthonia con- 
cluded a defensive alliance on November 1, 1923. 3 The 
closest agreements already existed between Finland 
and Esthonia, countries of identical race. On her 
side, Latvia signed with Lithuania, on July 1, 1925, 
a convention which has since been renewed, and 
which seems to be the possible starting point for a 
very close economic alliance. Finally, and chiefly, 
Latvia and Esthonia have now established and 
signed their Economic and Customs Alliance. 4 The 
customs frontier between the two countries has 
ceased to exist. Last June the two Ministers of For- 
eign Affairs met in Reval to remove jointly all minor 
technical difficulties, and ensure, even in the details, 
the unification of the Latvian-Esthonian economic 

Had I not grounds for saying that it was worth 
our while to study what these small states are doing? 
Where else in our Europe, more and more divided 
by economic barbed wires, could we hope to hear, I 
do not say of such an achievement, but simply of 
such a scheme ? 

So, we are confronted with concrete and profound 
realizations, and we have the right to think that the 
Baltic Union will end by asuming a common juridi- 
cal form, maybe that of a kind of Commonwealth 
where each State will retain its sovereign rights to 
the full ; something analogous, though starting from 

3 See Document V, p. 105. 

4 See Document VIII, p. 118. 



opposite standpoints, to the shape the British Do- 
minions are taking. 

It would seem that, in spite of their shared terror 
of the Russian neighbor — which fear, we must admit, 
is the beginning of wisdom — the Baltic States have 
but slowly advanced toward formal union, as if, at 
first, they wanted to taste, each of them, the full and 
young joys and responsibilities of independent exist- 
ence. Only after having been completely Latvian, 
Esthonian, Finnish, did they, with growing convic- 
tion, close the links that bound them — links which 
ensure safety, but do not crush individual vitality. 

You realize for what imperative European rea- 
sons we must follow the development of this Baltic 
microcosm in its international life. It reproduces all 
those causes of fear and hope, all those interests and 
ideals which, by reversing the magnifying-glass, we 
can see spread over the whole of Europe. With this 
difference : that in our old Europe not only are the 
obstacles gigantically greater, but long historical 
traditions of feeling and thought make our march 
forward so far more complicated. The dead, with us, 
in Europe, have almost as great a share in our po- 
litical decisions as the living. It is only fair for you, 
here in America, when you are apt to pass a quick 
condemnation on our errors and our madnesses, 
which indeed are grave and real, to remember that 
our long past is like a medal with two sides. If one 
bears our glories and our historical creations, the 
other one is charged with the saddening memories of 
our grudges and of our rancors. 



You all know how cautious are in general the official 
speeches of diplomats, cautious to the point of be- 
coming a collection of empty truisms. When on 
January 1 of the present year (1927), the various 
Diplomatic Corps presented their traditional good 
wishes to the Heads of States to whom they are ac- 
credited, they took the greatest care not to depart 
from the highly respected custom of speaking so as 
to say next to nothing. 

Two exceptions only occurred in Europe. It is re- 
markable that one of these occurred in the French 
and the other in the German capital. Remarkable 
also, that the authors of these two exceptional 
speeches were the Nuncios of the Holy See who 
spoke, the one to M. Doumergue and the other to 
Marshal von Hindenburg, in their capacity as Doy- 
ens (deans) of the Diplomatic Corps. These two 
speeches are worth re-reading, even so many months 
after their delivery, and I certainly do not know of 
many analogous instances in recent diplomatic ora- 
tory. The speech of Monsignor Maglione, Nuncio in 
Paris, is as follows: "Monsieur le President, the 
Diplomatic Corps, whose interpreter I have the 
honor to be, are happy to offer Your Excellency, in 
the names of the governments they represent, and in 
their own, their best wishes for the new year. 

"Deign to accept them. They are sincere and 


heartfelt ; they tell with what sympathy and satisfac- 
tion we follow the efforts put forth by France for the 
pacification of the peoples. We feel sure that your 
Government will continue this work, worthy of the 
traditions of your country, of its most noble soul and 
heart. The full confidence we already felt has been 
further confirmed by the projects that your Minister 
for Foreign Affairs announced, a little more than 
three months ago, to the representatives of so many 
nations. None can recall without emotion the dis- 
course he then pronounced. His words, so eloquent 
and so profoundly felt, expressed the desire of the 
nations for reconciliation and that spiritual brother- 
hood which will enable them to heal their wounds and 
guide them, through wholly peaceful emulation, to- 
ward ever higher moral, economic, and social prog- 

"In this beneficent work France may be assured 
of the active and loyal collaboration of our govern- 
ments, and in particular, permit me to say so, of Him 
who has never ceased to plead, with the tenderness 
of a father and in the name of the Prince of Peace, 
for a disarmament of minds. 

' ' G-od grant that soon, and in all truth may prove 
applicable to the relations which shall exist between 
the members of the great human family, the words of 
holy writ so joyfully recalled in our liturgy for the 
season, 'Justice and peace have kissed each other.' " 

On the same morning the Papal Nuncio in Berlin 
expressed the good wishes of the Diplomatic Body 
to President von Hindenburg. Monsignor Pacelli's 
speech, although, perhaps, in a less buoyant tone, 
was in perfect analogy with that of his colleague in 
Paris, which gave a clear indication, if any were 


needed, that the two prelates spoke according to in- 
structions from the Holy See. The particular distinc- 
tion of the past year, said Monsignor Pacelli, has 
been the fact that it saw the entry into the League of 
Nations of the great country that President von Hin- 
denburg so wisely guided. In spite of many obstacles 
the idea of peace and international cooperation had 
gained considerable ground, even though it was not 
yet possible to foresee the final effect of the efforts 
made in that direction. It was to be hoped that the 
seed sown would yield a rich harvest in the new year. 

In his reply the President said that if, as the Nun- 
cio had remarked, it was as yet impossible to foresee 
with certainty whether the efforts to achieve an 
understanding among the nations would have the 
desired success, he too was convinced that these en- 
deavors must be continued with the greatest energy, 
in order that the idea that all the nations are bound 
by common interests might become a reality. By her 
participation in the international agreement con- 
cluded, Germany had, during the past year, as the 
Nuncio had pointed out, again placed on record her 
willingness to collaborate in this task. 

On his side, the President of the French Republic 
in his reply to Monsignor Maglione took note, with 
particular pleasure, of the sympathy with which the 
work of pacification that France had traced for her- 
self is followed throughout the world. He added: 
"The year just ended has awakened an immense 
hopefulness in the countries still bruised and bleed- 
ing from the war. Marking fresh progress on the 
road to the reconciliation of the nations and the 
settlement of differences by arbitration, it has at last 
seen the establishment amongst the peoples, armed 


against each other in so many conflicts, of a peaceful 
collaboration which will be, for the world, a sure 
gage of security, if each brings thereto sincere good 
will and a spirit of generous humanity, without de- 
parting from a loyal observation of international en- 
gagements. ' ' 

This final "if" seemed to some, at the time, to 
imply a condition put on the Franco-German rap- 
prochement, or even to be a warning. It was, in fact, 
coming from the mouth of the head of a State, merely 
the bare enunciation of a plain natural necessity. To 
show how deep were his feelings, the French Presi- 
dent added a sentence which, almost in the same 
words, was, at the same moment, pronounced by the 
German President. "More than ever does it appear 
that the prosperity of a country cannot be conceived 
independently of that of other countries." Simple 
truths, these are. But it was something that they 
were recognized at the same moment in Berlin and in 

Apropos of this last phrase I have quoted, may I 
be permitted to recall a personal souvenir, solely 
with a view to showing that time, for all our blun- 
ders, has not passed in vain, and that even these 
words constituted a serious step forward from a 
gloomy past? In March, 1922, 1 presented my creden- 
tials as Ambassador to the predecessor of the pres- 
ent French President. My speech, which was some- 
what discussed afterward and, within the limits of 
French extreme courtesy, criticized in French con- 
servative circles, ventured to insist twice ( I say ven- 
tured because such words were not heard in official 
France in 1922) on the "necessity of a common work 
for the moral and economic peace of Europe. ' ' This 


peace, I added, "could only be found in a forth- 
coming general entente of the whole of western 

The President, who was then M. Millerand, as- 
sured rne in his answer that he shared all rny views 
with regard to entente and peace "in the world." I 
bowed, apparently satisfied, but felt at once that to 
answer "world" to my "Europe" was but a courte- 
ous way, not of denying, but of evading the problem. 

The speeches of the two Nuncios, in Paris and 
Berlin, made a deep impression throughout Europe. 

At first, in France, the essential ideas in the Nun- 
cio's speech and in President Doumergue's answer 
were not so much discussed as the fact that a foreign 
representative had seemed to take sides in what to 
many still appeared to be a purely French question : 
namely, the direction to be given to French foreign 
policy. This is not so strange when one considers the 
proud tradition of moral independence of all outside 
interference which, even among the most faithful 
French Roman Catholics, created the Gallican spirit, 
once famous in the relations between the Holy See 
and the French kingdom. Even amongst the warmest 
friends of the new Locarno policy many suspected 
that the Vatican was aiming at something more con- 
crete and immediate than the restoration of real 
peace in Europe. "Does the Vatican aim at the crea- 
tion of a French parliamentary Center Party such 
as exists in Germany?" was the suspicious Gallican 
question. In short, that happened which nearly al- 
ways happens in political discussions. Immediate in- 
terests, the passions of the moment, got the upper 
hand of farsighted views. 

But time soon quieted all these polemics and, in 


the case of the manifestations of the Holy See last 
January, history did her work rapidly. A few 
months have been sufficient to show that the Vatican, 
first criticized almost everywhere by excited minds, 
was, this time, inspired by a thought that soared far 
above and beyond the tactical interests of govern- 
ments and parties. 

What tempts me into taking for the subject of our 
last meeting the Papal thought concerning the prob- 
lem of European peace, is not so much the decisions 
the Vatican has arrived at, important as they are, as 
the study of the various stages and psychological 
moments the Holy See went through. We have in 
them, if I am not mistaken, a sort of deep mirror in 
which are reflected the unceasing preoccupations of 
the Christian world, preoccupations of concern to 
the Vatican, which finds itself compelled to reach a 
synthesis concluded above political frontiers and 
moral barriers. Daily political preoccupations, with 
their ordinary compromises, make themselves felt in 
the Vatican as in any human place ; but this synthe- 
sis, which is no less than the echoes of the human sor- 
rows and hopes, ends by overruling minor preoccu- 
pations and fears. 

We must, indeed, not forget that the Roman 
Church sees often clearer and farther owing to the 
fact that, by her very nature, she is bound, even if 
sometimes she seems to forget it, to disregard side 
issues, preoccupied as she is with handing on to a 
future, near or remote, that sum of ideas of which 
the Pontiff considers himself only the temporary and 
responsible guardian. 

The majority of governments are harassed by 
claims and rancors, the immediate satisfaction of 


which appears to them essential; and the Locarno 
achievements are to be paid, sometimes, by petty 
concessions to Caliban, in words or deeds, whereas 
the Chnrch of Eome has felt, has ended by feeling, 
what a terrible burden of responsibility would rest 
upon her doctrines if these were used for the pur- 
pose of unchaining or risking another war. She has, 
at the same time, perceived what immense conse- 
quences for or against Catholicism might depend one 
day upon her loyalty to or indifference toward the 
present intense need of reconciliation between the 
members of the distracted European family. She has 
understood that this need does not proceed from a 
state of mind changing like a fashion, but from an 
optimistic obligation, a sadly optimistic obligation, 
I would dare to say, for henceforth the nations must 
come to an understanding, or perish, must agree to- 
gether by force if not by love. And taking into ac- 
count that this need had already found concrete, 
if somewhat mediocre expression at Geneva, the 
Church has drawn therefrom the inference that this 
great human movement, which may take even a sort 
of religious form in the case of its purest adepts, 
must not develop outside the Church and almost 
against her. Former bias against the League of Na- 
tions is quickly forgotten at the Vatican. The solemn 
pronouncements of the Church, even in the period of 
armed peace that preceded and made inevitable the 
Great War, prove that with her it is not a case of 
sudden conversion. Did not the Church of Rome, one 
might even say, represent in the Middle Ages the 
rough plan of an international organization when 
kings and free communes equally submitted to a 
word from the Lateran ? 


Leo XIII, who, with Benedict XV, was the clearest 
mind that has ruled the Roman Church during the 
last two centuries, traced in 1894, in his letter Prae- 
clara gratulationis, the following lines, to which the 
tragedy of 1914 imparts an almost prophetic savor : 
' 'For many long years we have been living in a peace 
more apparent than real. A prey to mutual suspi- 
cions, the Nations are smitten with the fever of 
armaments. . . . This state of armed peace has 
grown intolerable. But in order to put an end to am- 
bitions, covetousness, rivalries, which are the kin- 
dlers of wars, we must come back to Christian vir- 
tues and, above all, to justice." 

The same Pope, in reply to the Queen of Holland, 
who had invited him to lend his moral support to the 
Peace Conference of 1899, expressed himself as fol- 
lows : "It is a noble idea and one closely connected 
with our ministry, which possesses a kind of high in- 
vestiture as a Mediator of peace." 

At the same time that the Pope was writing to 
Queen Wilhelmina, the Secretary of State, Cardinal 
Rampolla, was expressing to Count Mouravieff his 
hope that the Conference at the Hague "would suc- 
ceed in settling the differences between the nations 
by the simple means of moral forces . . . the adop- 
tion of mediation and arbitration appearing to be the 
most suitable system." 

The open political mind of Leo XIII, who was the 
first in modern times to use the expression "Societas 
Nationum" (Encyclical In pluribus of 1888) was 
entirely wanting in his successor Pius X; but the 
modest old Venetian curate had a sort of evangelic 
instinct that guided him to the same affirmations. 
When Andrew Carnegie founded the Endowment for 


International Peace, Pius X wrote to the Apostolic 
Delegate for the United States: "We greatly con- 
gratulate ourselves on this initiative. No reasoning 
man can fail to approve of it, particularly We who 
represent Him who is the Prince and God of Peace." 

Benedict XV succeeded Pius X at the moment 
when Belgium was invaded. The mind of this Pope, 
during the atrocious years of the War, was somewhat 
misunderstood by all of us. Our countries were 
struggling in the fiery furnace and we had, perhaps, 
the duty to be impassioned. He, who no longer be- 
longed to any country, could, at the height of the 
War, in August, 1917, indite the message containing 
the famous phrase on ''the useless slaughter," in 
which he proposed to the belligerents the threefold 
program : simultaneous and proportional decrease 
of armaments, compulsory arbitration, and interna- 
tional penalties. 

Then came the peace. The Treaty of Versailles 
consecrated the newborn Society of Nations. A year 
passed by. Great states were hostile to it, or were 
excluded. Truly that would suffice to excuse or ex- 
plain the coldness of the Holy See. 

All the same, those who were already convinced 
of the supreme necessity for Europe to strive at 
Geneva, since Geneva existed, for an organization 
that would eliminate the dangers of new disasters, 
which might prove irreparable, were forced six years 
ago to the opinion that the Encyclical Pacem Die 
(May 23, 1920) unduly ignored the Genevan institu- 
tion, in invoking ( and by invoking, treating as not yet 
existing) the formation of a Society of Nations, to 
ensure their reciprocal independence. "The Church 
(to quote from the Encyclical) will certainly not re- 


fuse its contribution to this League between the 
Nations based on Christian law." Such a phrase 
proves enough the papal diffidence toward the 
League of Nations two years after the Treaty of 

A change has evidently taken place in the pontifi- 
cal thought between the cold phrases of 1920 and the 
warm speeches of the Nuncios in 1927. Of course, it 
may be observed by Catholic dialecticians, principles 
remain always inviolate with the Church; it is only 
their empirical application that depends on times 
and opportunities. 

Quite true. When the Church gives way, and when 
the change seems too sudden, she may always invoke 
age-old principles to justify it. This happened, to 
take an example in another field, a few months ago, 
when, contrary to all traditions and in spite of the 
mistrust of four centuries of Christianity in China, 
the Holy See raised to the rank of bishops a certain 
number of Chinese priests. It had never been done 
before because there had always been the not unrea- 
sonable fear that the unextirpated Buddhism and 
Confucianism which form the very essence of every 
Chinese being, might ultimately transform, uncon- 
sciously but fatally, the orthodoxy of the Catholic 
doctrine. But the Chinese revolution was there with 
its violent exclusiveness. Bishops were at once con- 
secrated from among the Chinese, and to those who 
are surprised, evangelic texts are quoted amongst 
the flocks themselves. This does not, however, ex- 
plain how it was that these texts remained unapplied 
until the advance of the Canton revolutionaries 
toward the Yangtze. 

To return to our argument, the really important 


point of the problem lies in the reasons that can have 
led the Church to adopt her new attitude. It must be 
admitted at once that it is reducing the preoccupa- 
tions of the Papacy to the low level of the politicians 
to see, in the recent manifestations, nothing more 
than clever schemes for forming or strengthening, 
on either side of the Ehine, political parties to serve 
its own purposes. It is of some interest to note that 
this has been hinted, with more or less of apparent 
respect, especially by parties and papers who con- 
sider themselves as pillars of the Faith. It is fre- 
quently like that : under the cover of certain enthusi- 
asms for the Church, or Monarchy, or any other old 
institution, what in reality is hidden is the intention 
of being served by them. 

Let us seek higher and further for the reasons that 
have decided the Roman Church to show Geneva an 
active sympathy of which she was so chary six years 
ago. During these six years, in fact, Geneva has 
lived, which is a great deal for the Vatican; and 
what is still more, with the entry of Germany it has 
grown. But that is not all. 

The Roman Church had already shown herself 
aware, even before the oratorical manifestations in 
Berlin and Paris, that the different nationalisms 
which are making European life so difficult, might 
end by becoming a danger to the education of those 
new generations who, not having seen the War, have 
the impression of a glorious adventure in which 
there is everything to gain for one's country and 
self. The solemn placing on the Index of the French 
nationalist organ L' Action frangaise, which pre- 
ceded by a few days the speeches of the Nuncios, can 


only, in reality, be explained by the Church's anxiety 
in this direction. 1 

It is the dread of a newly appearing type of pagan 
Catholicism that more than any other argument has 
decided the Church in favor of the Geneva atmos- 
phere. It is the dread that this Catholicism, noisy as 
it is, trying as it does to catch adepts among the 
classes who so wrongly and so naively believe them- 
selves to be conservative, may end by compromising 
the Church. 

These dreads explain that the most important or- 
gan of the Catholic thought, the Civiltd cattolica, has 
gone so far as to express, in its number of last Octo- 
ber, the deepest sympathy with the Congress for 
Peace which the Internationale Democratique held 
at Bierville, in France, last summer. In this article 
the Civiltd cattolica anticipates the doctrinal objec- 
tions inspired by the traditional Catholic distrust 
toward any non-Catholic action. (This distrust is or- 
dinarily inculcated into the faithful because it is 
considered that any contact with non-Catholics, even 
in the service of high moral ideas, like the League of 
Nations, contains the risk of weakening the sense of 
spiritual distance that members of the Church are 
ordered to feel toward outsiders.) The Civiltd catto- 
lica, which is from its origins the organ of the Jesu- 
its, in this case reassures our minds, by this Distin- 
guo in which I leave it to you to look or not for the 
smell of the Jesuitical traditions illustrated by Pas- 
cal in his immortal Provinciales : 

"Unless we deceive ourselves, there is a great dif- 
ference between error and errants (tra error e e 

1 See also Document IX, p. 124. 


erranti). With error there can be, it is clear, no con- 
tact, no alliance, for light and darkness are ever mu- 
tually repellant. To the errants, on the other hand, 
we can always throw out bridges, and, on occasions, 
must do so, if it is true that the individual man is not 
the personification of error and evil." 

The same article finishes with these phrases which 
afford clear proof of the distrust entertained by 
the Vatican for the excesses of nationalistic doc- 
trines : "We would fain hope that the number of men 
of good will who are rich in a realistic not less than 
in an optimistic sense, increases more and more, and 
that the particularist and immoderately national 
spirit that still dominates too many consciences, is at 
last opening to a true view of international life. To 
contribute to this education is the grandest mission 
of the present time. The Rome of the Caesars could 
only discover ' Si vis pacem para bellum. ' The Rome 
of the Popes offers us the more human and Christian 
teaching : ' Si vis pacem, para pacem. ' ' ' 

If in France they had known and pondered more 
the expressions used in a paper so authorized, it is 
probable that less surprise would have been felt at 
the Paris speech of last January. 

The essential words had already been uttered. The 
same Civiltd cattolica had, in a previous number, 
gone so far as to say: "Bolsheviks who dream of 
imposing their Utopias upon the world, nationalists 
who, in a spirit of paganism, deify the national 
reality, have wished to sing a requiem on Wilson's 
work. We can in no way join their chorus, behind 
which are vibrating the passions that prepare and 
hasten bloody catastrophes. If an attempt is made 
to weaken or overthrow the League of Nations, the 


Catholics must rally to its defense. It must not die, 
but improve and live. ' ' 

What is meant by the word ' ' improve ? ' ' Are those 
right who think that, after the Papal manifestation 
of January 1, the Holy See intends, while at the same 
time striving for other contingent results, to enter 
the League of Nations? 

The Church of Eome is in reality much more a 
state than many states consisting of territories and 
citizens. She therefore pursues a policy which is dic- 
tated to her, according to the time, by the concep- 
tions she forms of her interests as a state. But, in 
certain questions of principle she never changes. 
When the Pope, in his letter to the Queen of Hol- 
land, declared himself to be the holder of a "high 
investiture as mediator of peace," he did not make 
use of a vague literary phrase. It was a prudent 
echo, such as the times permit, of the traditions of 
the great epoch of the Gregory's and Innocent's, tra- 
ditions that still retained sufficient power even in 
the century of the miscreant Machiavelli, for Alexan- 
der VI to be able to draw lines for the division of 
American lands across the Atlantic. It is difficult to 
believe that, even if invited, the Holy See could en- 
ter Geneva as inter pares. 

If the offer were made to him it is very unlikely 
that the Pope would explain to poor profane ears the 
reasons that would be dictated to him by a long theo- 
cratic exclusivism. He would not be wanting: in logi- 
cal reasons for his refusal, beginning with Article 16 
of the Covenant, which imposes the contribution of 
material concerted action against any State that 
might break its international pledges by an attempt 
against the peace. The Papacy has indeed summoned 


armies to fight against other armies, the last instance 
being the French intervention against our Mazzini's 
Roman troops in 1848, when it was a question of 
destroying the newborn republic and reestablishing 
papal rule. But under the new conditions in which it 
finds itself, it would have everything to lose by being 
obliged to participate, were it even by moral assent, 
in measures of repression and coercion. 

Even its occasional collaboration in the labors 
undertaken by the League, collaboration that has re- 
cently been frequently accorded, will not fail to be 
accompanied by sentiments of prudent reserve. It is 
natural that the Holy See should desire, for reasons 
of prestige, that such a great human Areopagus 
should publicly solicit its official collaboration. But, 
to quote an example which only to the profane may 
seem secondary, the Church of Rome will regard 
with distrust certain projects of the League of Na- 
tions, such as the reform of the calendar. If she col- 
laborates therein, it will be merely for the purpose 
of watching. The recollection of the decadis of the 
French Terror is today for us a picturesque episode. 
It remains for the Church, a shameful souvenir con- 
nected with the worshiping of the Goddess of Rea- 
son, as burning and fresh as if of yesterday. 

But let us drop secondary questions. It is time to 
come to a conclusion. What is certain is — I think I 
have demonstrated it — that the oldest of all reli- 
gious and, if you like, political institutions, in the 
western world has at last taken sides, in spite of 
her traditional prudence, in the great quarrel: the 
only one quarrel that matters for our future civiliza- 
tion. She has understood that the nervous starts of 
certain heated nationalisms — artificial as they are — 


may bring the peace into danger. She has realized 
that there will be either peace, with its uncertainties, 
its ups and downs, its painful social struggles, but 
for all that, peace, with an assured future of a life of 
progress and human dignity, or else another war, 
and, with the war, the merited destruction of a civi- 
lization that has degenerated into a brutal, material 
impetus without any common moral rule of life. 
When that happens it will be useless to look for reac- 
tionary police measures against the obscure forces 
of a new system of oriental slavery which — to the 
parties and men afraid of liberty — seemed, a few 
years ago, to be there, knocking at our doors from 
the East. There are no Chinese walls, no barbed 
wires, no ententes between so-called strong govern- 
ments that may be able to keep back the human tide 
toward a new form of hope, if the enraged national- 
isms and imperialisms are going to provoke a new 
bankruptcy of the European civilization. These, and 
these alone, are the accomplices and the allies of the 
so-called Russian danger. 

All our precautions would be like sand banks 
against the sea. There is only one way : to realize at 
last, and not only in the official phrases, that the true 
prosperity of our nations is dependent upon the 
prosperity of the neighbors ; that we will find all to- 
gether our salvation, or we will sink together. This 
we have refused to learn out of love. Maybe we are 
going to learn it, out of stern necessity, out of fear. 

May it be ! 




(Translated from Italian) 

The fact that so large a part of French public opinion is 
highly aroused, makes action by Italy, who above all desires 
peace, all the wiser. Even the question of dividing the min- 
ing region becomes less important in comparison to the dan- 
gers wbich threaten the general situation. 

Regarding as fundamental the principles of respect for 
treaties and of nationality, I propose the following : 

The persistent aggravation of the situation in Upper 
Silesia makes a prompt solution of the question advisable. 
But a meeting of the Supreme Council at this moment is 
impossible — particularly as it might only serve to increase 
further the tension between London and Paris. It is there- 
fore timely to settle the question through direct agreement 
between the three Allied Governments, the British, French, 
and Italian, on the following basis and on the premises rec- 
ognized by the three governments : 

1. that the question of Upper Silesia ought to be deter- 
mined according to the principles set up by the Treaty and 
according to the results of the plebiscite. 

2. that neither Poland nor Germany ought to take the 
law into their own hands. 

Inasmuch as the plebiscite has given to Germany less 
than 60 per cent of the individual votes, with majorities in 
less than 55 per cent of the communes, it would seem just 
to mark the frontier in such a way as to give to Germany 
and to Poland territories as far as possible proportional to 


the results of the plebiscite both in respect to area and to 

As bases for discussion rather than as definite proposals, 
I offer these two formulas : 


Poland shall have the southern part of the Circle of Rati- 
bor, on the right bank of the Oder, the Circle of Rybnik 
minus the northwestern salient traversed by the Ratibor- 
Gleiwitz railroad, which shall remain German ; the Circles 
of Kattowitz, Konigshiitte, Beuthen and Tarnowitz, the ex- 
treme southwestern rural section of the Circle of Gleiwitz 
and the southern point of the Zabrze district; the eastern 
part of the Lublinitz district including Stahlhammer. This 
solution will divide the industrial region leaving Gleiwitz 
and Zabrze to Germany. 


Poland shall receive territory according to the preceding 
formula minus Konigshiitte, the parts of the Circles of 
Beuthen and Kattowitz lying between Konigshiitte and the 
Circle of Zabrze. In compensation she shall receive the east- 
ern part of the Circles of Lublinitz and Rosenberg, with the 
two principal towns, in such a way as to hold all the railroad 
which connects Beuthen with Poland. 

This solution will leave a much larger part of the indus- 
trial region to Germany and will require a more complicated 
frontier, but it will assign to Poland an important railroad. 

The exchange of views between the three governments, 
British, French and Italian, as well as the eventual delib- 
eration to be left to the Council of Ambassadors, should be 
carried on with the utmost secrecy in order to guard against 
dangerous reactions in Upper Silesia. 

As soon as a definite decision has been reached it should 
be communicated to the governments at Berlin and War- 
saw, who will proceed to occupy their respective zones with 
regular troops. 




November 12, 1920 
(The official text is in Italian) 1 

In order to ensure the blessings of peace the Italian Gov- 
ernment and the Government of the State of the Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes have decided to stipulate the following 
convention, and have appointed, for the Italian Govern- 
ment, Mr. Giovanni Giolitti, Deputy to Parliament, Prime 
Minister, Count Carlo Sforza, Senator, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Doctor Ivanoe Bonomi, Minister of War; for the 
Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Mr. Vesnitch, Prime Minister, 
Doctor Ante Trumbitch, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
Stoyanovitch, Minister of Commerce, who have agreed on 
the following principles : 

I. The two Governments pledge themselves jointly to 
take all political measures calculated to prevent the restora- 
tion of the House of Hapsburg either to the throne of Aus- 
tria or that of Hungary ; 

II. The two Governments pledge themselves to afford, 
each to the other, such diplomatic assistance as is most suit- 
able to attain the above aim ; 

III. The two Governments pledge themselves to mark all 
activities directed against their reciprocal safety, whether 
coming from Austrian or from Hungarian territory, and 
to that end they will maintain the closest possible contact 
with each other. 

IV. The Italian Government, which has learned with 
satisfaction the understanding established between the 

1 The Yugoslav plenipotentiaries accepted the Italian text as 
the binding text and did not insist on a parallel Serbian text, as, 
according to diplomatic tradition, they were entitled to do. The 
same happened for the treaty of peace between Italy and Yugo- 
slavia signed at Rapallo on the same day. 


Serb-Croat-Slovene Government and the Czechoslovak Gov- 
ernment (exclusively with the same object as the present 
Agreement), and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, will 
bring this convention to the knowledge of the Czechoslovak 

V. This agreement will remain in force during two years 
after the exchange of the ratifications, and will be renewed, 
if not denounced six months before. 

VI. The present agreement shall be ratified as soon as 
possible and the ratifications will take place in Rome. 
Rapallo, 12 November 1920. 

(signed) G. Giolitti Vesnitch 

C. Sforza A. Trumbitch 
I. Bonomi Stoyanovitch 


February 8, 1921 
Exchange of letters of the two Foreign Ministers 


Rome, 8 fevrier 1921. 
Monsieur le Ministre, Je suis heureux d'etre dans le cas 
d 'avoir pu constater, pendant les conversations que j 'ai eu 
avec Votre Excellence, la parfaite identite des vues et des 
lignes directrices dans le domaine de la politique exterieure 
de nos deux Pays, — identite qui est une consequence des 
interets communs de nos deux peuples et apparait encore 
plus evidente quand il s'agit de 1 'application des traites de 
paix et de la politique a suivre envers les Etats suecesseurs 
de la monarchie austro-hongroise, parceque les buts aux- 
quels nous tendons dans l'interet de la securite et la pros- 
perite de nos peuples sont en parfaite concordance. 



Je me rejouis de cette constatation, d'autant plus qu'elle 
est une garantie de l'aecord et de la collaboration politique 
des deux Etats encore plus effieace que celle qui pourrait 
resulter des dispositions speciales d'une Convention. 

Mais considerant le fait que les frontieres italiennes ont 
ete fixees par la conclusion du traite de Rapallo entre 
l'ltalie et l'Etat des Serbes, Croates et Slovenes et qu'a 
cette occasion une Convention speeiale de caractere politi- 
que a ete conclue, il est natural que la communication faite 
au Gouvernement Tchecoslovaque sur le fondement de 
1 'article 4 de la meme Convention acquiere la signification 
que les accords et les engagements y contenus sont valables 
egalement pour l'ltalie et la Tchecoslovaque. 

Agreez, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma tres- 
haute consideration. 



Rome, 8 fevrier 1921. 

Monsieur le Ministre, J 'ai 1 'honneur de Vous accuser re- 
ception de Votre note, dont texte suit : 

(Here follows reproduction of preceding letter) 

Je suis heureux de pouvoir communiquer a Votre Excel- 
lence que mon Gouvernement est en plein accord avec le 
contenu de la note ci-dessus et je prie Votre Excellence de 
vouloir bien agreer 1 'expression de ma tres-haute considera- 

Edouard Benes. 




March 13, 1921 

(To take the place, as a free agreement, of the Tripartite 
Agreement between Great Britain, Prance, and Italy, made with- 
out Turkey's previous knowledge.) 

Son Excellence le Comte Sforza, President de la Delega- 
tion Italienne et Ministre des Affairs Etrangeres du Roy- 
aume d'ltalie d'une part, et Son Excellence Bekir Sami 
Bey, President de la Delegation de la grande assemblee na- 
tionale et Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Turquie 
d 'autre part, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes : 

1. Collaboration economique Italo-Turque avec droit de 
priorite pour les concessions d 'ordre economique a accorder 
par 1 'Etat en vue de la mise en valeur et du developpement 
economique dans les Sandjaks d'Adalia, Bourdour, 
Houghla, Isparta et d'une part des Sandjaks d ' Afion-Kara- 
Hissar et de Kutahya, Aidin et Konia a determiner dans 
1 'accord definitif, dans la mesure ou cela ne serait pas effec- 
tive direetement par le gouvernement Ottoman ou les ressor- 
tissants Ottomans a l'aide de capitaux nationaux. Conces- 
sion a un groupe Italo-Turc de la mine houilliere d'Hera- 
clee dont la limite sera determinee dans la carte qui sera 
jointe a 1 'accord definitif. 

2. Les concessions comportant monopole ou privilege, 
seront exploitees par des societes constitutes selon la loi 

3. Association la plus large possible de capitaux ottomans 
et italiens (la participation pouvant aller jusqu'a 50%). 

4. Le gouvernement royal d'ltalie s 'engage a appuyer 
efficacement aupres de ses allies toutes les demandes de la 
Delegation Turque relativement au traite de paix, speciale- 
ment la restitution a la Turquie de la Thrace et de Smyrne. 



5. Le gouvernement royal d'ltalie donne une assurance 
formelle que, au plus tard a la ratification de la pais, et 
d 'apres un accord entre les deux pays, il procedera au rap- 
pel de ses troupes actuellement sur le territoire ottoman. 

6. Les dispositions ci-haut formulees seront mises en 
vigueur en vertu d'une convention, qui sera stipulee entre 
les deux parties contractantes, immediatement apres la con- 
clusion d'une paix assurant a la Turquie une existence 
viable et independante et acceptee par elle. 

Fait a Londres, en double exemplaire le 13 Mars, 1921. 

Signe : Sfoeza 
S. Bekir 



November 1, 1923 

Fermement resolues de sauvegarder leur souverainete 
nationale et l'independance acquises au prix de tant de 
sacrifices ainsi que l'integrite de leurs territoires la Repu- 
blique d'Esthonie et la Republique de Lettonie ont decide 
de conclure un traite d 'alliance defensive. 

Dans ce but ont ete noinme en qualite de delegues pleni- 
potentiaires, savoir 

de la part de l'Esthonie 
Monsieur Fr. Akel, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, 

de la part de la Lettonie 
Monsieur Z. A. Meierovtcs, President du Conseil, Ministre 

des Affaires Etrangeres. 
lesquels, apres s'etre communique leurs pleins pouvoirs, 
trouves en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des disposi- 
tions suivantes : 


Article 1 

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent a suivre une 
politique purement pacifique ayant pour but de maintenir 
et de resserrer les liens d 'amitie ainsi que de developper les 
relations economiques avec toutes les nations et surtout en- 
tre les Etats Baltiques et les pays voisins. 

Article 2 

Afin de coordonner leurs efforts pacifiques, les deux 
Gouvernements s'engagent a se coneerter sur les questions 
de politique exterieure d'une importance commune et a se 
preter une aide reciproque politique et diplomatique dans 
leurs rapports internationaux. 

Article 3 

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent a s 'aider 
reciproquement dans le cas ou l'une d'elles serait attaquee, 
sans provocation de sa part sur ses frontieres actuelles. 

En consequence, au cas ou l'une des Hautes Parties Con- 
tractantes serait attaquee sans provocation de sa part, 
l'autre se considerera en etat de guerre et lui pretera une 
assistance armee. 

Article 4 

Les autorites techniques competentes de la Republique 
esthonienne et de la Republique lettone fixeront d'un com- 
mun accord la maniere dont les deux pays se preteront as- 
sistance et les dispositions necessaires pour l'execution de 
1 'article 3 du present traite. 

Article 5 

Si les Hautes Parties Contractantes, malgre leurs efforts 
pacifiques, se trouvaient en etat de guerre defensive con- 
formement a Particle 3, ils s'engagent a ne traiter ni con- 
clure 1 'armistice ni la paix 1 'une sans 1 'autre. 



Article 6 

Toutes les questions litigieuses qui pourraient surgir en- 
tre les Hautes Parties Contraetantes et qui ne peuvent pas 
etre resolues par voies diplomatiques, seront portees devant 
la Cour de Justice Internationale ou soumises a un arbitrage 

Article 7 

Aucune des Hautes Parties Contraetantes ne pourra eon- 
elure une alliance avec une tierce puissance sans le consente- 
ment de 1 'autre. Elles s'engagent a communiquer des a pre- 
sent l'une a l'autre le texte des traites conclus entre l'une 
d 'elles et un ou plusieurs autres Etats. 

Article 8 

La duree du present traite est de dix ans a partir du jour 
de Pechange des instruments de ratification. Ce terme ex- 
pire chacune des deux Parties Contraetantes aura la faeulte 
de la denoncer en avisant l'autre Partie un an d'avanee. 

Article 9 

Le present traite sera communique a la Societe des Na- 
tions dans le but d 'y etre enregistre et publie. 

Article 10 

Le present traite sera ratifie et les instruments de ratifi- 
cation seront echanges dans le plus bref delai a Riga. 

En foi de quoi les plenipotentiaries ont signe le present 
traite et j ont appose leurs sceaux. Fait en double exem- 
plaire a, Tallinn le ler novembre mil neuf cent vingt trois. 

Fr. Akel Z. A. Meierovics. 




January 17, 1925 

Les Republiques d'Esthonie, de Finlande, de Lettonie et 
de Pologne, decides a developper les relations amicales qui 
existent entre Elles et decidees a donner, dans leurs rap- 
ports reciproques, la plus large application au principe du 
reglement des differends internationaux par des moyens 
pacifiques, ont resolu de conclure une Convention de conci- 
liation et d 'arbitrage. A cet effet ont ete nommes Plenipo- 
tentiaries : 

par le President de la Republique d 'Esthonie : 

Monsieur C. R. Pusta, Ministre des Affaires Etran- 

par le President de la Republique de Finlande : 

Monsieur Hj. J. Procope, Ministre des Affaires Etran- 

par le President de la Republique de Lettonie : 

Monsieur S. Meierovics, Ministre des Affaires Etran- 

par le President de la Republique de Pologne : 

Monsieur le Comte A. Skrzynski, Ministre des Af- 
faires Etrangeres, 
lesquels Plenipotentiaires, dument autorises, sont convenus 
des articles suivants: 

Article 1 

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes desirant appliquer 
dans leurs rapports mutuels les principes dominants du 
Pacte de la Societe des Nations developpes par le Protocole 
de Geneve adopte le 2 octobre 1924, sont resolues a se servir 
des moyens y prevus pour le reglement pacifique des con- 
flits qui pourraient surgir entre Elles. 



Article 2 

Les Hautes Parties Contraetantes s'engagent a soumettre 
a une procedure de conciliation ou a 1 'arbitrage tous les 
differends qui pourraient s'elever entre Elles et n'auraient 
pu etre regies par la voie diplomatique dans un delai raison- 
nable. Toutefois 1 'engagement preeite ne se rapportera ni 
aux questions qui de par leur nature juridique relevent uni- 
quement de la legislation interne de la Partie en cause ni 
aux differends concernant le Statut territorial des Hautes 
Parties Contraetantes. 

Tout differend susceptible d'etre reglede la maniere indi- 
quee ci-dessus sera soumis a une procedure de conciliation, 
a moins que les Parties en litige ne conviennent de le sou- 
mettre immediatement a 1 'arbitrage. 

Au cas ou le rapport elabore par la Commission de con- 
ciliation instituee en vertu de 1 'article 6 de la presente Con- 
vention n'aurait pas ete accepte par toutes les Parties en 
litige, le differend sera soumis a l'arbitrage, si l'une des 
Parties le demande. 

Article 3 

S'il s'agit d'un differend qui, a teneur de la legislation 
interne de l'une des Hautes Parties Contraetantes, releve 
de la competence des tribunaux, les tribunaux administra- 
tifs y compris, la Partie defenderesse pourra s'opposer a ce 
qu'il soit soumis a l'arbitrage ou a, une procedure de con- 
ciliation avant qu'un jugement definitif ait ete rendu par 
l'autorite judiciare competente. 

Article 4 

Dans le cas ou le recours a une procedure arbitrale serait 
prevu dans une convention anterieurement conclue dont ne 
font partie que les Etats signataires de la presente Conven- 
tion, il est convenu que tout differend auquel la convention 
anterieure s 'appliquerait, sera soumis par les Etats entre 
lesquels le conflit est surgi a une commission de conciliation 
ou a l'arbitrage, conformement a la presente Convention. 


Article 5 

II est entendu que les obligations assumees par les Hautes 
Parties Contractantes en vertu de la presente Convention 
n'entravent aucunement leur faculte de soumettre, d'un 
eommun accord, un differend qui aurait pu surgir entre 
Elles, a la Cour permanente de Justice Internationale. 

Article 6 

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes etabliront dans les trois 
mois du depot de la derniere ratification de la presente Con- 
vention une Commission permanente de conciliation, com- 
posee de quatre membres, a raison d 'un membre nomme par 
chacune d 'Elles, et d'un president designe d'un eommun 
accord parmi les ressortissants d'un Etat tiers. A defaut 
d 'entente entre les Parties, le President sera nomme, a la 
requete de l'une d 'Elles, par le President de la Cour per- 
manente de Justice Internationale. 

La partie desirant soumettre un differend a la procedure 
de conciliation s'adressera au President de la Commission 
permanente. Celui-ci portera immediatement cette notifica- 
tion a la connaissance de la Partie ou des Parties adverses 
et invitera les Parties en litige a completer le nombre des 
membres nommes par Elles par des membres supplemen- 
taires ad hoc, a raison d'un membre pour chaque Partie en 
litige, ces derniers membres devant etre choisis parmi les 
ressortissants d 'un Etat tiers et nommes dans un sants d 'un 
Etat tiers et nommes dans un delai ne depassant pas six 
semaines, a compter du jour de 1 'invitation. Au cas ou la 
nomination n 'aurait pas eu lieu dans le delai prescrit, les 
membres supplementaires seront designes par le President. 

Les membres permanents de la Commission nommes par 
les Parties en litige ainsi que les membres supplementaires 
seront convoques sans retard par le President et constitue- 
ront ensemble avec lui la Commission nommes par les Par- 
ties en litige ainsi differend soumis a la procedure de con- 



Article 7 

Toute commission de conciliation connait de sa compe- 
tence d'apres les articles precedents. 

Si l'un des Etats entre lesquels un conflit est snrgi l'avait 
soumis a une procedure de conciliation et si la Partie adverse 
faisant valoir la competence de la Cour permanente de Jus- 
tice Internationale, cette competence etant, dans le cas 
donne, obligatoire pour les Parties, lui soumettait le meme 
differend, Pexamen de celui-ci sera suspendu jusqu'a ce que 
la Cour ait statue sur sa competence. 

La requete ainsi adressee a la Cour par l'une des Parties 
suspendra les mesures prevues a Particle 6, jusqu'a ce que 
la Cour ait statue sur sa competence. 

Article 8 

Les membres de la Commission permanente seront nom- 
mes pour trois ans. Sauf accord contraire entre les Hautes 
Parties Contractantes, ils ne pourront pas etre revoques 
pendant la duree de leur mandat. En cas de deces ou de 
retraite de Pun d'eux il devra etre pourvu a son remplace- 
ment pour le reste de la duree de son mandat, si possible 
dans les deux mois qui suivront et, en tout eas, aussitot 
qu'un differend aura ete soumis a la Commission. 

Article 9 

Si, a 1 'expiration du mandat d'un membre de la commis- 
sion permanente, il n'est pas pourvu a son remplacement, 
son mandat est cense renouvele pour une periode de trois 
ans : toutefois, sur la demande de 1 'une des Parties les f onc- 
tions du President doivent cesser a la fin de son mandat. 

Un membre dont le mandat expire pendant la duree 
d'une procedure en cours continue a prendre part a l'exa- 
men du differend jusqu'a ce que la procedure soit termi- 
nee, nonobstant le fait que son remplacant ait ete designe. 

Article 10 

Dans un delai de quinze jours, a dater de celui ou l'un des 


Etats Contraetants aura porte un differend devant la Com- 
mission, ehacune des Parties pourra pour 1 'examen du litige 
vise, remplacer le membre permanent designe par Elle par 
une personne possedant une competence speciale dans la 

La Partie qui voudrait user de ce droit, en avertira im- 
mediatement la Partie adverse; dans ce cas, celle-ci a la 
faculte d'user du droit dans un delai de quinze jours a 
partir de celui ou 1 'avertissement Lui est parvenu. 

Article 11 

La Commission se reunit dans l'endroit que les Parties 
designent d'un commun accord ou, a defaut d 'accord, au 
siege de la Societe des Nations. 

La Commission pourra, si elle le juge necessaire, se reunir 
dans un autre endroit. 

Article 12 

Les Parties en litige fourniront a la Commission toutes 
les informations utiles et lui faciliteront, a tous egards, 
l'accomplissenient de sa tache. 

La Commission pourra, le cas echeant, demander au Sec- 
retaire General de la Societe des Nations 1 'assistance du 
Secretariat, si la Commission en a besoin pour ses travaux. 

Article 13 

La procedure devant la Commission est contradictoire. 

A defaut d'une decision contraire prise a l'unanimite, les 
dispositions contenues aux titres III et rV de la Conven- 
tion de la Haye pour le reglement pacifique des conflits in- 
ternationaux, du 18 octobre 1907, seront appliquees a la 
procedure devant la Commission. 

Les debats ne sont publics que si la Commission, d 'accord 
avec les Parties, en decide ainsi. 

Article 14 

Les decisions de la Commission sont prises a la majorite. 
Chaque membre dispose d'une voix, celle du President etant 



decisive en eas de partage. La Commission ne peut prendre 
des decisions portant sur le fond du differend que si tous 
les membres sont presents. 

Article 15 

La Commission fera un rapport sur le differend qui lui a 
ete soumis. Le rapport comportera un projet de reglement 
du differend, si les circonstances y donnent lieu et si trois 
au moins des membres de la Commission, le President etant 
considere comme membre, se mettent d 'accord sur un tel 

L'avis motive des membres restes en minorite sera con- 
signe dans le rapport. 

Article 16 

Sous reserve du droit des Parties en litige de prolonger 
ce delai, la Commission doit acbever ses travaux dans un 
delai de six mois, a compter du jour de la premiere reunion 
de la Commission. 

Le temps durant lequel les travaux de la Commission sont 
suspendus selon les dispositions de l'article 7 n'est pas com- 
pris dans le delai susmentionne. 

Article 17 

Le rapport de la Commission est signe par le President et 
porte sans delai a la connaissance des Parties en litige et du 
Secretaire general de la Societe des Nations. 

Article 18 

Les Parties, dont le differend a ete soumis a la Commis- 
sion, porteront a Leur connaissance reciproque, ainsi qu'a 
la connaissance du President de la Commission permanente, 
dans un delai raisonnable, si Elles acceptent les constata- 
tions du rapport et les propositions qu'il renferme. 

II appartient aux Parties en litige de decider, d'un com- 
mun accord, si le rapport de la Commission doit etre publie 
immediatement. A defaut d'un accord, la Commission 


pourra, en cas de raisons speciales, proceder a la publica- 
tion du rapport. 

Article 19 

Lorsque, en vertu des dispositions de 1 'article 2, un dif- 
ferend sera soumis a l'arbitrage, le Tribunal arbitral sera 
etabli par l'accord des Parties. 

A defaut de constitution du Tribunal par l'accord des 
Parties, il sera procede de la maniere suivante : 

Chaque Partie nommera deux arbitres dont l'un doit etre 
pris sur la liste des membres de la Cour permanente d 'arbi- 
trage et choisi a l'exclusion de ses propres nationaux. Les 
arbitres ainsi designes cboisiront ensemble le President du 
Tribunal. En cas de partage des voix, le choix du President 
est confie au President de la Cour Permanente de Justice 

Article 20 

Lorsqu'il y aura lieu a un arbitrage entre les Parties en 
litige, Elles etabliront, dans un delai de trois mois au plus 
tard, un compromis special concernant l'objet du litige ainsi 
que les modalites de la procedure. A defaut de clauses com- 
promissoires contraires, Elles se conformeront pour tout ce 
qui concerne la procedure arbitrale aux dispositions etablies 
par la convention signee a la Haye le 18 octobre 1907 pour 
le reglement pacifique des conflits internationaux y compris 
les articles 53 et 54 et tenant compte de Particle 83 de ladite 

Article 21 

La sentence arbitrale est obligatoire. Si, toutefois, la sen- 
tence etablissait qu'une decision d'une instance judiciare 
ou de toute autre autorite relevant de l'une des Hautes 
Parties Contractantes se trouve entierement ou partielle- 
ment en opposition avec le droit international, et si le droit 
constitutional de cette Partie ne permettait pas ou ne per- 
mettait qu'imparfaitement d'effacer par voie administra- 
tive les consequences de la decision dont il s'agit, il sera 



accorde a la Partie lesee une satisfaction equitable d'un 
autre ordre. 

Article 22 

Les Parties s'abstiendront, durant le cours de la proce- 
dure de conciliation ou d 'arbitrage, de toute mesure pou- 
vant avoir une repercussion prejudiciable sur l'acceptation 
des propositions de la Commission ou sur l'execution de la 

Article 23 

Cbacune des Parties indemnisera les membres de la Com- 
mission ainsi que les arbitres nommes par Elle ou designes, 
faute de nomination, par le President, conformement a 
Particle 6. L'indemnite du President sera fournie par les 
Parties en litige en proportion egale. 

Les Parties doivent chercher a s 'entendre pour que les 
indemnites soient fixees d'apres les memes principes. 

Chaque Partie supportera les frais de procedure encourus 
par Elle, ceux declares communs par la Commission ou le 
tribunal seront supportes par les Parties en proportion 

Article 24 

Les dispositions de la presente Convention seront appli- 
cables meme si les differends qui viendraient a s'elever 
avaient leur origine dans des faits anterieurs a sa conclu- 

Article 25 

II est entendu que la presente Convention n'apportera 
aucune modification aux obligations des Etats signataires 
fondees sur le Protocole pour le reglement pacifique des dif- 
ferends internationaux, adopte a Geneve le 2 octobre 1924. 

Article 26 

Tout differend relatif a l'interpretation de la presente 
Convention sera soumis a la Cour permanente de Justice 


Article 27 

La presente Convention sera ratifee et les ratifications 
seront deposees a Helsinki (Helsingfors) aussitot que faire 
se pourra. Elle entrera en vigueur immediatement apres le 
depot des ratifications et aura une duree de trois annees a 
dater du depot des ratifications accompli par tous les Etats 
signataires. Si elle n'a pas ete denoncee six mois au moins 
avant l'expiration de ce delai, elle restera en vigueur pend- 
ant une nouvelle periode de trois ans et sera ainsi de suite 
censee renouvelee chaque fois pour trois ans, sauf denoncia- 
tion six inois au moins avant l'expiration de la precedents 
periode de trois ans. 

Nonobstant la denonciation par l'une des Hautes Parties 
Contractantes, la Convention demeurera en vigueur en ce 
qui concerne les Parties qui ne l'auront pas denoncee. 

En foi de quoi les Plenipotentiaires respectifs ont signe 
la presente Convention et y ont appose leurs cachets. 

Fait a Helsinki (Helsingfors) en quatre originaux, le 17 
janvier, de Tan 1925. 

C. R. Pusta. 
Hj. J. Procope. 
Z. A. Meierovtcs. 
Al. Skrzynski. 




les progres realises par chacun des Pays Participants dans 
1 'organsation de sa vie nationale, comme d 'autre part la 
consolidation de la situation politique generale dans 1 'Eu- 
rope orientale. 




que cet etat de choses resulte en partie de la politique de 
collaboration suivie par ces Etats au cours des cinq derni- 
eres annees. 

Les Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres d'Esthonie, de Fin- 
lande, de Lettonie et de Pologne declarent enregistrer avec 
la plus vive satisfaction les resultats heureux de la collabo- 
ration des quatre Etats Participants au cours des appre- 
ciant a leur juste valeur les fruits de cette collaboration 
passee et le grand interet que presente pour chacun des 
Pays Participants sa continuation a l'avenir, 

conviennent de fixer les lignes generales de leur collabo- 
ration future et de signer 1 'accord ci-apres qu'ils s'engagent 
a soumettre a Tagrement de leurs Parlements respectifs. 

(a) Les H.P.C. s'engagent a poursuivre entre eux la 
collaboration loyale et confiante inauguree par la confer- 
ence d'Helsingfors du 15 Janvier 1920 et continuee dans 
les conferences consecutives. Elles affirmerent a, nouveau 
leur volonte de completer autant que possible afin de fixer 
sur de solides bases juridiques leurs relations mutuelles, le 
systeme de traites, accords et conventions les liant entre 
elles, ainsi que de tendre leurs efforts vers une action com- 
mune dans le domaine de la politique internationale. Elles 
considerent comme un devoir stricte de se communiquer des 
leur ratification tous les traites, accords et conventions que 
chacune d 'Elles contractera avec toute Puissance etrangere. 

(b) Dans l'application de la Convention d'Arbitrage et 
de Conciliation, signee a Helsingfors le 17 Janvier 1925, 
elles s 'inspireront des memes sentiments qui ont preside a 
son elaboration, et verront dans les organismes j prevus de 
veritables institutions de paix cbargees de la mission de 
maintenir entre Elles l'entente et 1 'harmonic 

(c) Parfaitement conscientes des obligations que leur 
cree leur qualite de membres de la S. d. N., les H.P.C. con- 
firment leur volonte de remplir dans leur plenitude ces obli- 
gations dans leurs relations mutuelles afin de pouvoir bene- 


fieier dans une mesure equivalente des avantages corre- 
spondants, specialement en ee qui concerne la garantie de 
leur securite et de leur independance ainsi que le maintien 
de la paix dans 1 'Europe orientale. 

(d) La collaboration entre les H.P.C. se poursuivra in- 
dependamment de la forme normale des relations diplomati- 
ques, dans des conferences periodiques des quatre Etats. 
Ces Conferences se tiendrent, suivant le principe deja 
etabli, deux fois par an. 

(e) Le present accord est ouvert a 1 'adhesion de tout 
Etat limitrophe de l'une des H.P.C. qui s'inspirerait des 
memes principes d 'entente et de collaboration, sous reserve 
du consentement des Etats Signataires. 



February 5, 1927 

Le Gouvernement de la Republique d'Esthonie et le 
Gouvernement de la Republique de Lettonie animes du 
desir d'etendre leur collaboration economique au dela des 
limites fixees dans le traite preliminaire d 'Union economi- 
que et douaniere entre l'Esthonie et la Lettonie, signe a 
Tallinn le Ier novembre 1923, ont resolu de conclure a cet 
effet un Traite ayant pour but l'Union douaniere entre les 
deux Etats et ont designe a cet effet pour leurs Plenipoten- 
tiaires, savoir: 

Le Gouvernement de la Republique d 'Esthonie 
M. Akel, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 

Le Gouvernement de la Republique de Lettonie 
M. Cielens, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 
lesquels, apres s'etre communique leurs pleins pouvoirs 
trouves en bonne et due forme, se sont mis d 'accord sur les 
dispositions suivantes : 



Article 1 

Des 1 'entree en vigueur du present Traite, le Traite pre- 
liminaire d 'union economique et douaniere entre l'Esthonie 
et la Lettonie, signe a Tallinn le Ier novembre 1923, est 
considere comme abroge. 

Un mois apres 1 'entree en vigueur des lois, conventions et 
arrangements prevus par Particle 6 pp. 1-7, sauf les ex- 
ceptions prevues par 1 'art. 8, alinea 4, une union douaniere 
est etablie entre la Republique d'Esthonie et la Republique 
de Lettonie et les territoires des deux Etats Contractants 
seront considered comme ne formant qu'un seul territoire 
au point de vue de la douane. La perception des droits de 
douane sur les marcbandises allant du territoire de l'un des 
pays au territoire de 1 'autre sera supprimee. 

Article 2 

Chacune des Parties Contractantes s 'engage a accorder 
sur son territoire aux ressortissants de l'autre le meme 
traitement qu'a ses nationaux en tout ce qui concerne l'uti- 
lisation, la possession et la disposition des biens immeubles, 
le commerce, l'industrie, la navigation, la juridiction et 
l'application des reglements administratifs ainsi que tous 
les impots quel que soit leur caractere. Toutefois en ce qui 
concerne 1 'acquisition des biens immeubles, la f ondation des 
societes anonymes et autres societes et associations com- 
merciales, industrielles, financieres ou d 'assurance, la pecbe, 
la construction navale nation ale, le cabotage et le remor- 
quage, les Parties Contractantes ne se garantissent recipro- 
quement que le traitement qui est reserve aux ressortissants 
et aux personnes juridiques de la Nation la plus favorisee. 

Article 3 

Les ressortissants de cbacune des Parties Contractantes 
seront reciproquement exempts de tout service militaire 
personnel, de la participation aux organisations militaires 
ainsi que de toute contribution militaire, soit en argent, soit 
en nature. 


Dans un but militaire, ils ne pourront etre sounds a des 
obligations de service et de requisition autres que celles qui 
incombent aux citoyens du Pays et ils ont, sur base de re- 
ciprocite, droit a, la retribution prevue pour les nationaux 
de chacun des deux Pays. 

Ils seront egalement dispenses de toute charge et de toute 
fonction judiciaire ou municipale quelconque. 

Article 4 

Les certificate de jauge delivres par les autorites compe- 
tentes de l'une des Parties Contractantes seront acceptes 
par l'autre Partie, si le jaugeage a ete execute d'apres le 
systeme Moorsom. 

Article 5 

Les Parties Contractantes procederont sans delai a la 
nomination d'une Commission generale mixte et paritaire, 
chargee, conformement aux dispositions du present Traite, 
de 1 'execution des travaux preliminaires de 1 'union douani- 
ere esto-lettonne. La Commission generale se mettra d 'ac- 
cord sur le reglement d'ordre interieur. Pour faciliter ses 
travaux, la Commission generale est autorisee a proceder a 
la nomination de sous-commissions speciales. 

Article 6 

La Commission generale sera chargee : 

(1) d'elaborer un tarif douanier commun estho-letton ; 

(2) d 'unifier la legislation douaniere des deux Etats; 

(3) d 'unifier la legislation concernant les accises et les 
monopoles des deux Etats ; 

(4) d 'unifier les tarifs de transport et de communication 
des deux Etats, notamment ceux de chemins de fer, 
de navigation, d 'aeronautique, des postes, tele- 
graphes, telephones et T.S.F. ; 

(5) de regler la question des recettes douanieres de fa<jon 
qu'une compensation reciproque juste soit atteinte 
apres constatation soit par l'enregistrement des 
marchandises allant du territoire de 1 'un des pays au 



territoire de 1 'autre, soit par d 'autres metbodes ap- 
propriates, des pertes fiscales eventuelles des deux 

(6) d 'unifier la legislation concernant les impots, les 
contributions directes et les brevets de commerce, 
ainsi que la legislation concernant la protection du 
travail ; 

(7) de coordonner la politique d 'emission et d'escompte 
des banques centrales des deux Etats ; 

(8) d 'examiner tous les traites de commerce afin de ren- 
dre possible 1 'unification du systeme des traites de 
commerce des deux Etats ; 

(9) d 'examiner toutes les questions concernant 1 'union 
douaniere, et de donner son avis a leur sujet en les 
presentant aux Gouvernements respectifs. 

Article 7 

Tous les projets de lois unifiees et tous les projets de con- 
ventions elabores en application des dispositions de 1 'article 
6 du present Traite par les soins de la Commission generale, 
seront presentes aux Gouvernements respectifs et ils n'en- 
treront en vigueur qu'apres leur adoption par les institu- 
tions legislatives des deux Etats et l'echange des instru- 
ments de ratification respectifs. 

Toutes les autres decisions de la Commission generale 
prises en vertu de 1 'article 6 n 'exigent pour leur mise en 
vigueur que l'approbation des deux Gouvernements. 

Article 8 

Les travaux prevus par Particle 6 p. 1 doivent etre exe- 
cutes dans un delai d'un an a compter du jour de 1 'entree 
en vigueur du present Traite. 

II est toutefois entendu qu'en cas de necessite et si les 
deux Gouvernements y consentent, la presentation du tarif 
douanier commun aux institutions legislatives peut etre 
ajournee par six mois. 

Tous les autres travaux prevus par 1 'article 6 doivent etre 
executes dans un delai permettant de presenter aux institu- 


tions legislatives les pro jets respectifs de lois ou de conven- 
tions en temps convenable pour que la ratification et 
l'echange des documents de ratification puissent etre effec- 
tues pendant les 3 annes qui suivront le jour de 1 'entree en 
vigueur du tarif douanier unifie. 

La Commission generale a, toutefois, le droit, en ce qui 
concerne 1 'unification des lois visees dans 1 'article 6, a 1 'ex- 
ception du tarif douanier commun, de decider queues dis- 
positions des lois respectives pourront rester non unifiees, 
ou de prolonger temporairement le delai de leur unification. 
Les decisions susmentionnees de la Commission generale 
entreront en vigueur apres leur approbation par les deux 
Gouvernements. Toutefois, la non-execution des travaux 
vises dans lesdites decisions ou leur prolongation tempo- 
raire n'empeche pas l'entree en vigueur de 1 'union douani- 
ere dans le delai fixe par l'article 1. 

Tous les delais prevus dans le present article pourront 
etre prolonges, mais seulement d'un commun accord entre 
les deux Gouvernements. 

Article 9 

Les taux du tarif douanier commun doivent etre fixes 
en francs-or et pour le payement des droits de douane 
l'Esthonie acceptera la Eesti-kroon or sur base de parite 
(1 : 0.72009). 

Les banques d 'emission des deux Etats echangeront le 
lats contre la Eesti-kroon sur base de parite or sans percep- 
tion de commission. 

Article 10 

Les litiges ou divergences d 'opinion entre les deux Par- 
ties Contractantes sur 1 'application et Interpretation du 
present Traite seront tranches par un tribunal arbitral 
mixte. Le tribunal arbitral sera constitue ad hoc et devra 
comprendre un nombre egal de representants des deux par- 
ties. Si ces representants ne parviennent pas a. se mettre 
d 'accord, ils feront appel a un tiers-arbitre neutre dont la 
designation, a defaut d 'accord entre les deux Parties, sera 



demandee an President de la Cour Permanente de Justice 

Article 11 

Sans attendre 1 'execution du present Traite, les deux 
Parties Contractantes procederont a 1 'elaboration d'un 
traite economique provisoire tendant a faciliter la circula- 
tion des produits du sol, de 1 'agriculture et de l'industrie 
des deux pays avant meme que 1 'union soit realisee. 

Article 12 

Le present Traite sera ratine et les ratifications en seront 
echangees a, Tallinn. II entrera en vigueur le jour de 
1 'echange des instruments de ratification. 

Le present Traite reste en vigueur pendant dix ans a 
compter de la date prevue par l'art. 1. Ce terme expire, il 
restera en vigueur pendant les deux ans qui suivront le 
jour de sa denonciation par Tune des Parties Contractantes. 

Fait en double expedition en frangais et signe a Riga, le 
5 fevrier 1927. 

(L.S.) Pr. Akel. (L.S.) F. Cielens. 


Ad art. 2. (1) II est entendu que la faveur du traitement 
national accordee reciproquement aux ressortissants de 
l'autre Etat au sujet du droit d 'etablissement ne de- 
viendra applicable qu'a compter du jour de l'entree en 
vigueur de l'Union douaniere entre les deux Etats- 
Quant au temps precedant le terme vise ci-dessus les 
deux Gouvernements s'engagent a accorder reciproque- 
ment, en ce qui concerne le droit d 'etablissement, le 
traitement de la nation la plus favorisee. 

(2) Les dispositions de 1 'article 2 du present Traite 
ne seront pas considerees comme derogeant aux dispo- 
sitions de 1 'art. 18 de la convention de f rontiere en date 
du 19 octobre 1920 et de 1 'art. 6 de la Convention com- 


plementaire de frontiere en date du Ier novenibre 1923, 
en ce qui concerne la liquidation des biens immeubles 
partages par la ligne de frontiere. 
Riga, le 5 fevrier 1927. 

(L.S.) Fr. Akel. (L.S.) F. Ceelens. 



(This manifestation of Papal thought means of course much 
more than the simple condemnation of a new book of French 
nationalist authors, when it says that their ideals are "contrary 
to the real catholic spirit.") 

Ussita, le 28 aout 1927. 

Eminentissime Seigneur, 

Avec un retard inevitable, me sont parvenus dans eette 
relative solitude, d'abord la nouvelle, ensuite, dans la Se- 
maine religieuse de Paris, le texte de la condemnation que 
Votre Eminence a portee contre le livre L' Action fran- 
gaise et le Vatican, tout dernierement publie par Ch. Maur- 
ras et L. Daudet. 

Votre Eminence a bien raison de penser et de dire qu'un 
pareil livre peut faire beaucoup de mal. 

II peut le faire et presque inevitablement il doit le faire 
a ceux qui jurant in verba de tels maitres, comme aussi a 
tous ceux qui n'ont aucun moyen de mettre les choses a 
leur place et les voir sous leur vrai jour, grace au systeme 
suivi avec tant d'obstination, et meme accentue dans ce 
nouveau livre, malgre les paroles reiterees du Souverain 
Pontife ; systeme, dis-je, de changer et de deplacer sans 
cesse la question du terrain religieux au terrain politique, 
national et international; en pretant aux personnes, aux 
paroles et aux faits, des intentions, des significations ainsi 



que des rapports, qui n'ont jamais existe; en cherchant, je 
ne saurais si plus hypocritement ou plus effrontement, a 
couvrir, sous de mensongeres expressions de respect et de 
soumission, de veritables et tres graves irreverences, pous- 
sees jusqu'a l'insulte, a la desobeissance et a la revolte 

Tout ce que dit Votre Eminence pour motiver cette con- 
damnation publique peut bien suffire pour f aire comprendre 
a tous, et specialement a ceux qui veulent etre de vrais et 
bons catboliques, ce qu'ils doivent penser de ce livre, et 
comment ils doivent regler leur conduite a ce propos. 

Le Saint Pere desire que Votre Eminence voie dans ce 
que je lui ecris sa satisfaction et sa pleine approbation pour 
la condamnation qu'elle a portee sur un livre qui, dans un 
sens tres vrai, est tout ce qu'il y a de plus etranger et meme 
de plus contraire a 1 'esprit vraiment catholique et romain. 

Daigne Votre Eminence agreer 1 'assurance de la pro- 
fonde veneration avec laquelle, en lui baisant les mains, 
j 'ai 1 'honneur de me declarer, 

de Votee Eminence, 
le tres humble et tres obeissant serviteur, 




The allusion contained in chapter III (p. 35) to the fa- 
mous letter of the Austrian Emperor to his brother-in-law 
Prince Sixte of Bourbon to get a separate peace for Aus- 
tria, provoked a protest from the said prince, denying : (a) 
that the Austrian proposal meant the breaking of the En- 
tente treaties with Italy; (b) that the German Emperor 
was cognizant of the demarche. 


On his arrival in Europe, back from America, Count 
Sforza answered by the following letter, which appeared in 
the European press on the last days of September, 1927. 

' ' Rentre de New- York en Europe par Anvers, je vois les 
Debats du 14 avec la lettre du prince Sixte de Bourbon. 

"Ainsi que je le fais constamment, je ne releverai aucune 
allusion personnelle. 

"Je ne perdrai meme pas de temps a reevoquer ce 
qu'aurait pu etre pour l'ltalie 1 'off re de l'Empereur 
Charles. On le tira assez au clair a Saint-Jean-de-Mauri- 

"Le point nouveau est mon affirmation que les chefs de la 
guerre allemande connaissaient la demarche du souverain 
austro-hongrois. Le prince Sixte de Bourbon le nie. Sa 
bonne foi est, certes, absolue ; j 'ajoute meme que beaucoup, 
presque tous, et des plus haut places, l'ignorerent, et en 
Allemagne et en Autriche. 

"Cela s 'etait deja vu: tres probablement Bethmann- 
Hollweg ignora la violence fatale de l'ultimatum autrichien 
a la Serbie ; qui ne 1 'ignorait pas etait 1 'ambassadeur alle- 
mand a Vienne, Tchirski, ni les cercles militaires et dynasti- 
ques qu'il informait au-dessus de la chancellerie. Ce sont les 
avantages des gouvernements a, politique personnelle. . . . 

"Le prince Sixte de Bourbon dit tres justement que ce 
qui importe, a present, c'est de 'parer aux dangers,' etc. 
Mais — tout est la — si on croit que 1 'Autriche imperiale 
etait digne de vivre, et que c 'est grand dommage qu 'elle ne 
vive plus, cela signifierait que les Etats successeurs, Tche- 
coslovaquie, Yougoslavie, Roumanie agrandie, ne sont pas 
des entites a la vie sure, des elements essentiels de l'Europe 
de demain. lis ne seraient que des constructions diplomati- 
ques. C'est — parait-il — l'avis de Lord Rothermere, et de 
quelques autres. 

"Croyez, etc. . . . 

Sforza. ' ' 


Action francaise(L') placed on 
Index by Holy See, 92, 124 

Adriatic (Upper), Yugoslav 
gravitation toward, 44 

Akel, Fr., 105, 107, 118, 123, 124 

Albania, 34 

Alexander I and his manifesto to 

France, 4 
Alexander VI, 95 
Alide, Princess, 54 
Allenstein, Plebiscite of, 17, 18, 

Allies, 2 

Alpine frontier between Italy 

and Yugoslavia, 42 
Amet, Admiral, 52 
Austria, 8, 38, 40, 50, 125, 126 
Austria-Hungary, 33, 34, 37, 44, 

46, 67 

Baltic States, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 

77, 78, 80, 81 
Battisti, Cesare, 29 
Bekir Sami bey, 60, 62, 63, 64, 

104, 105 
Benedict XV, 89, 90 
Benes, Eduard, 37, 38, 44, 103 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor, 

Bohemia, 34 

Bonaparte (Napoleon) and Eu- 
ropean peace, vi, vii 

Bonomi, Ivanoe, 101, 102 

Bourbon, Prince Sixte de, Em- 
peror of Austria's letter to, 35, 
125, 126 

Branting and Baltic Delegates in 
1918-1919, 71 

Briand, Aristide, 13, 25, 26, 75, 
76, 83 

Bulduri Conference, 71, 73, 74, 76 

Bulgaria and her possible federa- 
tion with other Yugoslav coun- 
tries, 49 

Calogeropulos at 1921 London 

Supreme Council, 63 
Calthorpe, Admiral, 51, 52, 54 
Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 

89, 90 

Cherso (Island of) annexed to 

Italy, 42 
Chinese catholic bishops, 91 
Chinese revolution, 91 
Cielens, F., 118, 123, 124 
Cilicia, 12 

Civilta Cattolica (La), 93, 94 
Croatia, 44 

Curzon, 26, 54, 57, 60, 64, 65, 75, 

Czechoslovakia, 39, 41, 44, 47, 50, 

Dalmatia, 43 

Danube Commission, 41 

Danzig, 17, 18 

Daudet, Leon, 124 

Denikin, General, 12 

Denmark, Participation of, in 

Balto-Scandinavian Conference, 


Deschanel, Paul, 36 
Dmowski and Versailles Confer- 
ence, 17 
Doumergue, Gaston, 82, 86 
Dubois, Cardinal, 124 

Entente, Little, 37, 48 
Erich, his idea of Northern Lo- 
carno, 78 
Esthonia, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 



75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 105, 108, 
118, 119, 122 

Ferid Pasha (Damad), 54 

Ferrero, Guglielmo, 4 

Finland, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 

74, 77, 78, 79, 80, 108 
Fiume, 6, 42 

France, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 
16, 22, 23, 24, 45, 50, 63, 64, 
83, 84, 86 
Franchet d'Esperey, General, 51 
Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 37 
Frederic II and Danzig, 12 

Gasparri, Cardinal, 124, 125 
Geneva Protocol, 77, 108 
Genoa Conference, 76 
Georgia and recognition of her 

independence, 76 
Germany, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 22, 

23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 86, 99, 

100, 126 
Giolitti, Giovanni, 101, 102 
Goethe, W. von, 16 
Grabski at Spa Conference, 21 
Great Britain, 23, 24, 50, 63, 64, 


Greece, 55 

Hapsburgs, Convention against 

the, 43, 44, 101 
Hapsburg, House and Monarchy 

of, 9, 10, 34, 36, 40, 41, 43, 44, 

48, 49 

Harrington, General, 58, 59 
Hindenburg, Marshal von, and 

the Hohenzollern, 15; and 

peace, 82, 83, 84 
Hohenzollern, House of, 15 
Holy See, see Vatican 
Hungary, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 50 
Huss and Czech spirit, 34, 50 

Istria, 42 

Italy, 12, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
28, 29, 33, 36, 40, 43, 44, 47, 
50, 61, 62, 63, 64, 101, 104, 
105, 125, 126 

Jonescu, Take, and Italy and 

Little Entente, 46 
Journal des Debats and French 

Austrophilia, 36 

Kant, Emmanuel, 17 

Karl, Emperor of Austria, 35, 37, 

40, 43, 44, 45, 48 
Kemal (Mustafa) Pasha, 54, 55, 

56, 59, 61 
Kerenski, Alexander, 70 
Kolehak, Admiral, 12 
Korfanty's insurrection in Upper 

Silesia, 22, 23, 26 

Latvia, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 
76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 105, 108, 118, 

Lausanne, Treaty of, 64 

League of Nations, 7, 27, 29, 74, 
84, 88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 112 

Leo XIII and peace, 89 

Lerond, General, and Polish in- 
surrection in Upper Silesia, 23, 

Lithuania, 18, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 


Lloyd George, David, 20, 21, 54, 

57, 60, 61, 63, 76 
Locarno policy, 86 

Lussin, Island of, annexed to 
Italy, 42 

Macedonia, 49 

Maglione, Monsignor, his speech 

for peace, 82, 84 
Maistre, Joseph de, and Austria, 


"Magyars, The Awakening," 40 



Marienwerder, Plebiscite in, 17, 
18, 19 

Masurians in the Polish Corridor, 

Maurras, Charles, 124 
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 10, 96 
Mejeroviz, Z. A., 75, 78, 105, 107, 

108, 116 
Memel, 18 

Millerand, Alexandre, 21, 61, 86 
Milne, General, 59 
Mouravieff, Count, 89 
Mudania, Armistice of, 64 
Mudros, Armistice of, 51 

Nevoso, Mount, necessary to 

Italy, 42 
Ninchich and Czecho-Yugoslav 

Convention, 37 
Nitti, Francesco, 4 
Norway, 71 

Oberndorf, Count, 22 

Pacelli, Monsignor, his speech for 
peace, 83, 84 

Paderewski and Versailles Con- 
ference, 17 

Percival, Colonel, and Upper 
Silesian partition, 23 

Pilsudski, Marshall, 26 

Pilz's dismissal asked by Count 
Sforza, 26 

Pius X and his utterances about 
peace, 90 

Poincare, Eaymond, 13, 15, 65 

Poland, 9, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
23, 24, 25, 30, 31, 39, 46, 47, 
48, 71, 72, 73, 77, 78, 99, 100, 

Procope, H. J., 108, 116 
Prussia, 8, 18; East, 17 
Pusta, Charles-Eobert, 75, 78, 
108, 116 

Quai d'Orsay, 4, 56 

Eampolla, Cardinal, 89 
Eapallo, Treaty of, 42, 101 
Bothermere, Lord, 126 
Buhr, 7, 14 

Eumania, 33, 39, 50, 126 
Eumbold, Sir Horace, his belief 

in Bolshevik victory in Poland, 


Eussia, 13, 18, 21, 22, 33, 68, 69, 
70, 72, 73, 79 

Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, Inter- 
allied meeting at, 126 

Salisbury, Lord, and the atlases, 

San Eemo Conference, 60 

Sapieha, Prince, 46, 47 

Serbia, 33, 44, 48, 49 

Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, King- 
dom of the, 39, 44, 50, 101, 126 

Sevres, Treaty of, 60, 63 

Sforza, Count Carlo, 1, 11, 14, 
25, 26, 36, 39, 41, 42, 44, 52, 
53, 54, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 
75, 76, 85, 99, 101, 102, 103, 
104, 105, 126 

Sforza Line in Upper Silesia, 27, 

28, 99 

Silesia, Upper, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 

29, 31, 47, 99 
Skirmunt, Constantin, 47, 76 
Skrzynski, Count, 108, 116 
Smyrna, 54, 55, 104 

Soldau and Bolshevik occupation 

of Polish Corridor, 23 
Spa conference, 21, 39, 41, 61 
Stoyanovich, 101, 102 
Sweden, 71 

Swiss Government and the Em- 
peror Karl, 45 
Syria, 12 



Tewfik Pasha and London Su- 
preme Council in 1921, 62, 63 

Thiers, Adolphe, 15 

Tommasini (Francesco) and Po- 
lish situation in 1920, 21, 26 

Trentino, 29 

Trialism, 37 

Trieste and Austro-German 
propaganda during war, 29; 
and frontier line, 42 
Tripartite Agreement, 63, 104 
Trumbich, Ante, 37, 39, 41, 101, 

Turkey, 51, 54, 56, 57, 62, 104, 

United States and Eussia, 73 

Vatican, 33, 34, 82, 86, 87, 90, 

91, 92, 95, 96 
Venizelos, Eleutherios, 57, 61, 62 

Versailles, Treaty of, 1, 2, 5, 10, 

17, 22, 24, 30, 90 
Vesnieh, 101, 102 
Vienna, Congress of, 2, 3, 5 

Weygand's (General) Strategi- 
cal advice to Polish army, 21 

Wilhelmina, Queen, 89 

William II and his rhetorical 
phrases, 31, 32 

"Wilson, Sir Henry, 57 

Wilson, Woodrow, and the two 
faces of the Versailles Treaty, 
5, 6, 7 

Yugoslavia, see Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes, Kingdom of the 

Zara, annexed to Italy, 42 
Zita, ex-Austrian Empress, and 
her Bourbon blood, 35 


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